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Throughout the long march of history, gay men and lesbians in
virtually every culture have tried to celebrate and protect their rela-
tionships in the same ways that heterosexual couples do.' From the
thirteenth century until the twentieth century, however, Western soci-
eties suppressed expressions of love and commitment among lesbians
and gay men with almost unparalleled virulence.2 No living tradition
of public recognition of committed lesbian and gay relationships sur-
vived in most of the West.3
* J.D. 1996; A.B. Stanford University, 1991. This Note is dedicated to my husband
Scott, whose constant love and support (and occasional prodding) helped make this Note a
reality.
1. A good overview of this history is available in WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., THE
CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 15-50 (1996). An earlier but generally more detailed
version directed to a legal audience appears in William N. Eskridge Jr., A History of Same-
Sex Marriage, 79 VA. L. REv. 1419 (1993). See also Milton C. Reagan Jr., Reason, Tradi-
tion, and Family Law: A Comment on Social Constructionism, 79 VA. L. REv. 1515 (1993)
(commenting on Professor Eskridge's article).
The most authoritative historian is the late Prof. John Boswell. See JOHN BOSWELL,
SAME-SEX UNIONS IN PREMODERN EUROPE (1994) [hereinafter BOSWELL, SAME-SEX UN-
IONS] (giving an exhaustive treatment through the Middle Ages, when same-sex unions had
a remarkable degree of acceptance even in religious contexts); see also JOHN BOSWELL,
CHRISTANrry, SOCIAL TOLERANCE, AND HOMOsExuALIrrY (Phoenix ed. 1981) [hereinaf-
ter BOSWELL, CHRISTTANry] (a study of attitudes toward homosexuality in Europe from
the beginning of the Christian era through the Middle Ages).
2. BOSWELL, SAME-SEX UNIONS, supra note 1, at 262-79; ESKRIDGE, supra note 1, at
35-37; Eskridge, supra note 1, at 1469-74.
3. BOSWELL, SAME-SEX UNIONS, supra note 1, at 262-64. Interestingly, long after
most Western societies had eradicated any civil recognition of same-sex unions, ancient
religious ceremonies were still performed in the Catholic church. ld. at 263-70.
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Part of the struggle of the modem American gay rights move-
ment, which began in the 1960s, has been the attempt to win the right
to marriages recognized in civil4 and religious 5 society. Every judicial
4. The early attempts in the 1970s to secure legal recognition of same-sex marriages
uniformly failed. See, e.g., Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973); Baker v.
Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972); Singer v.
Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974); see also ESKRIDGE, supra note 1, at 48-49 &
nn.107-108, 56 & n.24, 130 & n.18 (citing other reported and unreported cases from the
1970s to the 1990s).
Interestingly, even most gay and lesbian Americans were probably unaware of these
cases at the time. See Joan Steinau Lester, Why Gays Will Vote for Mr. Faithless, S.F.
EXAMINER, June 23, 1996, at B1l.
5. Success has been greater in religious life in recent years. Probably the strongest
support has come from the Unitarian Universalist Association, which adopted a resolution
in 1984 encouraging its ministers to perform same-sex services of union, followed by a 1989
resolution reaffirming the religious equality of same-sex committed relationships with mar-
riages, and a 1996 resolution supporting legalization of same-sex marriages. SCOTT W.
ALEXANDER, UNITARIAN UNIVERSALISM: A WELCOMING PLACE FOR GAY, LESBIAN, AND
BISEXUAL PEOPLE (UUA Pamphlet Comm'n ed., circa 1992) (pamphlet, on file with au-
thor); Resolutions of Immediate Witness: Support of the Right to Marry for Same-Sex
Couples, WORLD: J. UNITARIAN UNIVERSALIST Ass'N, Sept.-Oct. 1996, at 51; History of
UU Involvement in and Support of Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Issues (circa 1992) (unpub-
lished leaflet, on file with author); see also Rev. Scott W. Alexander, Letter to the Hon.
Shellie Bowers re Dean v. District of Columbia, No. CA 90-13892 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1991),
reprinted in ESKRIDGE, supra note 1, at 196-97.
Rabbis affiliated with the Reconstructionist movement of Judaism have also per-
formed same-sex commitment ceremonies for years. David W. Dunlap, Rabbis Endorse
Gay Marriage, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 29, 1996, at A8. The Central Conference of American
Rabbis, which represents the Reform movement, has not taken a position on religious
ceremonies but recently voted to support civil marriage, which some member rabbis (both
proponents and opponents) view as a precursor to endorsing religious ceremonies. Id.
Some Buddhist temples have also taken public stances in favor of same-sex marriage.
Elaine Herscher, When Marriage Is a Tough Proposal, S.F. CHRON., May 15, 1995, at Al,
A10.
At the same time, other religious organizations have become increasingly vocal in
their opposition to gay marriage, whether civil or religious. When the city of San Francisco
began to offer civil ceremonies that include an exchange of vows to domestic partnership
registrants, it drew sharp criticism from Catholic Archbishop William Levada:
I believe that a "ceremony of recognition" of gay and lesbian relationships
symbolizes an attempt to redefine the basic human institution of marriage estab-
lished by nature and creation .... The participation of civic officials in such a
ceremony will be deeply offensive to many citizens and will be rightly seen as an
attack on the sanctity of marriage.
David T Iler, S.F. to Marry 150 Gay Couples, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 23, 1996, at Al, A13.
Another local cleric also interpreted the purely civil ceremony as an offensive sacrilege and
belittled the need of lesbian and gay couples for a recognized legal status:
Recently, the San Francisco Board of Supervisors, in a contemptuous and
brazen attempt to turn the social order upside-down, foisted upon city residents a
new civil ceremony for homosexual and lesbian "marriage." ... [which will] fur-
ther the social disaster that already surrounds us....
... The devastation of human life here in San Francisco [i.e., by the AIDS
crisis] has only further proven the catastrophic results of abandoning the church's
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challenge to the denial of recognition was turned back6 until 1993,
when the Supreme Court of Hawaii held in Baehr v. Lewin that the
statutory restriction of marriage to heterosexual couples presump-
tively violated the state constitutional guarantee of equal protection of
the law.7 Although the case, now styled Baehr v. Miike, is on remand
stance, and confirmed to be the only truly compassionate option for those who
genuinely love and care for their fellow human beings....
... As for those who seek to lovingly and compassionately care for the basic
needs of others, numerous and very adequate statutory provisions already exist to
accommodate hospital visitation, common title to property, inheritance, health
care, power of attorney and many other legal necessities.
David C. Innes, Open Forun: A Christian View on Gay Marriages, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 8,
1996, at A19. Oppositionfrom Levada and Innes did not deter top city officials, including
Mayor Willie Brown, from officiating at the inaugural ceremony, which attracted the atten-
tion of the national and international news media. April Lynch, Gay Couples Joyously
Exchange Vows in S.F, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 26, 1996, at Al; Joe Strupp, 175 Gay Couples
Say "I Do," THE INDEPENDENT (S.F.), Mar. 26, 1996, at 1, 5.
More notoriously, the Southern Baptist Convention passed a resolution this year urg-
ing its members to boycott the Walt Disney Company largely because it offers health bene-
fits to the same-sex domestic partners of its employees, a policy the Baptists characterized
as "promotion of homosexuality [over] its historic commitment to traditional family val-
ues." Southern Baptists Call for Boycott of Disney, S.F. CHRON., June 13, 1996, at A2.
For other religious groups, the issue has caused unreconciled controversy. The Con-
servative movement of Judaism has neither taken a position on civil marriage nor sanc-
tioned performance of religious ceremonies, but some rabbis have performed services of
union anyway. Tller, supra, at A13 (quoting Rabbi Alan Lew of Congregation Beth Sho-
lom in San Francisco). The Evangelical Lutheran Church in America has spent several
years attempting to formulate an official position on human sexuality, but seems hopelessly
torn between advocates and opponents of gay Lutherans. Arthur S. Leonard, Law & Soci-
ety Notes, 1995 LESnIAN/GAY L. NoTEs 124. The experience in Presbyterian, Episcopal,
and Methodist churches has been similar. ESKRIDGE, supra note 1, at 47. Before the re-
cent explosion of media interest in the issue of same-sex marriage, these denominations
had already been divided over the ordination of openly lesbian and gay clergy. See Don
Lattin, Heresy Charge Dropped Against Episcopal Bishop, S.F. CHRON., May 16, 1996, at
Al (reporting that retired Bishop Walter Righter, who had ordained an openly gay deacon,
was only the second bishop in the 206-year history of the Episcopal Church to be charged
with heresy; also noting similar controversies over ordination in the United Methodist
Church and the Presbyterian Chruch U.S.A.); Ex-Archbishop of Canterbury Ordained
Gays, S.F. CHRON., May 17, 1996, at A16 (reporting that Lord Robert Runcie, who as
Archbishop of Canterbury was head of the Church of England and of the worldwide
Anglican Communion to which the Episcopal Church belongs, had knowingly ordained
gay priests in spite of official Church policy against such ordinations, which he deemed
"ludicrous"); Methodist Bishops Back Church Law Against Gays, S.F. CHRON., April 24,
1996, at A5 (reporting that the 67-member Council of Bishops of the United Methodist
Church voted to continue a ban on ordination of gays and lesbians, but acknowledged that
there are "serious differences" on the issue within the denomination).
6. See supra note 2; see also Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. 1995)
(per curiam).
7. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 67 (Haw. 1993). Unlike its federal counterpart, the
Hawaii equal protection clause expressly extends to sex-based discrimination. HAw.
CONsT. art. I, § 5. Hawaii also enacted a counterpart to the Equal Rights Amendment
July/August 19961
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to give the State of Hawaii the opportunity to justify its marriage stat-
ute under the strict scrutiny test,8 most observers expect that the state
will fail to do so, opening the door for same-sex marriage in Hawaii. 9
Already a major tourist destination, Hawaii would undoubtedly
become a favored site for lesbian and gay honeymooners, much as
Nevada and Mexico once were havens for Americans in need of a
quick divorce. But when these honeymooners get home, will they still
be married in the eyes of the law? And will even newly married gay
and lesbian Hawaiians have to wonder whether their marriages will be
recognized by the Internal Revenue Service, the Social Security Ad-
ministration, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Depart-
ment of Veterans' Affairs, or the local post office?
The question whether the Full Faith and Credit Clause' ° of the
federal Constitution would compel other states to recognize same-sex
marriage is a difficult one that has already been addressed by a
number of other authors." Federal recognition is another matter en-
proposed for the federal constitution. HAw. CONST. art. I, § 3. Although the Baehr court
declined to declare that same-sex marriage was a fundamental right because the trial court
had dismissed the action on the pleadings before evidence was taken, it announced that
classifications based on sex would be to strict scrutiny. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 67. The statu-
tory restriction of marriage to heterosexual couples would thus be presumed unconstitu-
tional unless the state could establish at trial after remand that a compelling state interest
supported the restriction and that it was narrowly drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment
of the constitutional rights of same-sex couples. Id.
8. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 67, 68, 74-75. The trial in the case, now styled Baehr v. Miike,
took place in September 1996, as this Note went to press. Arthur S. Leonard, Domestic
Partnership & Marriage Notes, 1996 LESBIAN/GAY L. NoTES 35, 35; Critical Gay Marriage
Trial in Hawaii Puts Focus on Parenting, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 16, 1996, at A8. The trial
court's judgment is expected before the end of 1996. Critical Gay Marriage Trial, supra, at
A8.
9. Herscher, supra note 5, at A10. Indeed, Gov. Ben Cayetano has publicly stated
that Hawaii has no compelling interest in preventing same-sex marriage, alarming con-
servative state legislators and other opponents of same-sex marriage. Leonard, supra note
8, at 35. Conservative legislators reportedly attempted to intervene in the case, fearing that
the state will not adequately defend its marriage statute. Id. The Hawaii Supreme Court
has already denied permission to intervene to representatives of the Mormon Church,
holding that it neither had shown that the state would inadequately defend the case nor
was in danger of being forced to perform same-sex marriages. Baehr v. Miike, 910 P.2d
112, 114-16 (Haw. 1996).
10. U.S. CONST. art IV, § 1 (providing that "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in
each state to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State" and
that "Congress may... prescribe ... the Effect thereof"); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1739 (1994)
(providing that "[a]ll nonjudicial records ... of any State, Territory, or Possession of the
United States ... shall have the same full faith and credit in every court and office within
the United States and its Territories or Possessions as they have by law or usage in the
courts or offices of the State, Territory, or Possession from which they are taken").
11. Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Competitive Federalism and the Legislative Incentives to
Recognize Same-Sex Marriage, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 745 (1995); Barbara J. Cox, Same-Sex
Marriage and Choice of Law: If We Marry in Hawaii, Are We Still Married When We
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tirely; although many federal benefits and obligations depend on mar-
riage, federal deference to state determinations of marital status is
almost complete.12 Federal recognition will depend upon a number of
factors, including congressional intent and national uniformity. In
many cases, federal authorities may be called upon to decide impor-
tant questions of marriage recognition before the state full-faith issue
has wended its way through the courts.
Return Home?, 1994 Wis. L. REv. 1033; Deborah M. Henson, Will Same-Sex Marriages Be
Recognized in Sister States?: Full Faith and Credit and Due Process Limitations on States'
Choice of Law Regarding the Status and Incidents of Homosexual Marriages Following Ha-
waii's Baehr v. Lewin, 32 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 551 (1993-1994); Joseph W. Hovermill,
A Conflict of Laws and Morals: The Choice of Law Implications of Hawaii's Recognition
of Same-Sex Marriages, 53 MD. L. REv. 450 (1994); Lynn D. Wardle, A Critical Analysis of
Constitutional Claims for Same-Sex Marriage, 1996 B.Y.U. L. REv. 1; Evan Wolfson,
Crossing the Threshold- Equal Marriage Rights for Lesbians and Gay Men and the Intra-
Community Critique, 21 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 567 (1994-1995); Evan Wolfson
& Gregory S. McCurdy, "Let No One Set Asunder". Full Faith and Credit for the Validly
Contracted Marriages of Same-Sex and Different Sex Couples (forthcoming); Anthony Do-
minic D'Amato, Note, Conflict of Laws Rules and the Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex
Marriages, 1995 U. ILL. L. REv. 911; Thomas M. Keane, Note, Aloha, Marriage? Constitu-
tional and Choice of Law Arguments for Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages, 47 STAN. L.
REv. 499 (1995); Candace L. Sage, Note, Sister-State Recognition of Valid Same-Sex Mar-
riages-Baehr v. Lewin-How Will It Play in Peoria?, 28 IND. L. REV. 115 (1994).
For other commentary, see Marty K. Courson, Baehr v. Lewin: Hawaii takes a Tenta-
tive Step to Legalize Same-Sex Marriage, 24 GOLDEN GArE U.' L. REV. 41 (1994); Jordan
Herman, The Fusion of Gay Rights and Feminism: Gender Identity and Marriage After
Baehr v. Lewin, 56 Omo ST. L.J. 985 (1995); Anthony C. Infanti, Baehr v. Lewin: A Step
in the Right Direction for Gay Rights?, 4 LAW & SEXUALry 1 (1994); Christine Jax, Same-
Sex Marriage-Why Not?, 4 WIDENER J. PuB. L. 461 (1995); Christopher J. Keller, Divin-
ing the Priest: A Case Comment on Baehr v. Lewin, 12 LAW & IuNo. J. 483 (1994); Mark
Strasser, Domestic Relations Jurisprudence and the Great, Slumbering Baehr: On Defini-
tional Preclusion, Equal Protection, and Fundamental Interests, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 921
(1995); Erik J. Toulon, Call the Caterer: Hawaii to Host First Same-Sex Marriage, 3 S. CAL.
REv. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 109 (1993); Otis Damslet, Same-Sex Marriage, 10 N.Y.L. SCH.
J. HUM. Rrs. 555 (1993); Jonathan Deitrich, Comment, The Lessons of the Law: Same-Sex
Marriage and Baehr v. Lewin, 78 MARO. L. REV. 121 (1994); Megan E. Farrell, Baehr v.
Lewin: Questionable Reasoning, Sound Judgment, 11 J. CoNTM E. HEALTH L. & POL'Y
589 (1995); William M. Hohengarten, Note, Same-Sex Marriage and the Right of Privacy,
103 YALE L.J. 1495 (1994); Scott K. Kozuma, Note, Baehr v. Lewin and Same-Sex Mar-
riage: The Continued Struggle for Socia Political and Human Legitimacy, 30 WiLLAMEsrE
L. REV. 891 (1994); Jeanine Perella McConaghy, Case Comment, Constitutional Law-
Hawaii Subjects Sex-Based Classifications to Strict Scrutiny Analysis-Baehr v. Lewin, 28
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 164 (1994); Jeffrey J. Swart, Comment, The Wedding Luau-Who Is
Invited? Hawaii, Same-Sex Marriage, and Emerging Realities, 43 EMORY LJ. 1577 (1994).
Some states are already preparing to resist same-sex marriages by enacting statutes
purporting to deny recognition to same-sex marriages. In other states, however, legislation
has been killed. See infra notes 185-87.
12. See, e.g., Boyter v. Commissioner, 668 F.2d 1382, 1385 (4th Cir. 1981) (adopting
the Government's argument that "under the Internal Revenue Code a federal court is
bound by state law rather than federal law when attempting to construe marital status").
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Another issue was raised on September 21, 1996, when President
Clinton signed the so-called Defense of Marriage Act ("DOMA")
into law. 13 This statute, driven into law by election-year politics, 14 ex-
pressly bars recognition of same-sex marriages for any federal pro-
gram or law.' 5 However, it will soon face a vigorous constitutional
challenge in the courts,' 6 and even if it is held to be constitutional, it
may not produce the precise the results that its sponsors intended with
respect to income and estate taxation. 17 It is thus unlikely to be the
final word on the subject.
This Note argues that the Internal Revenue Service should recog-
nize same-sex marriages performed in Hawaii (or any state that fol-
lows Hawaii's lead) for purposes of federal income, estate, and gift
taxes. Federal recognition would further the historic congressional in-
tent not only to defer to state-law determinations of marital status, but
also to interpret and enforce the Internal Revenue Code uniformly
and consistently throughout the United States. Federal recognition
would also further the states' authority to regulate marriage, a tradi-
tional part of the states' police powers, without the uninvited interfer-
ence of federal authorities. Until the litigation over the full-faith issue
13. Defense of Marriage Act [DOMA], Pub. L. No. 104-199 (1996) (to be codified at
1 U.S.C. § 7, 28 U.S.C. § 1738C).
14. See Carolyn Lochhead, Senate Battle on Restricting Gay Marriages, S.F. CHRON.,
July 12, 1996, at A3 (quoting Sen. Kennedy's opinion that DOMA is "a mean-spirited form
of legislative gay-bashing designed to inflame the public four months before the November
election"). Supporters insist that DOMA came before Congress this year because of "the
Hawaii decision and ... activists who want to have same-sex marriages throughout the
country." Id. (quoting Sen. Nickles). The fact remains, however, that the Hawaii Supreme
Court rendered its decision setting the constitutional standard in Baehr v. Lewin three
years ago, and its final review of the trial court's decision is still one if not two more years
away. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993); Henry J. Reske, A Matter of Full Faith,
A.B.A. J., July 1996, at 32, 33; see also id. at 32 (characterizing the flurry of legislative
activity this year as "a remarkable rush to ban same-sex marriages").
15. DOMA sec. 3 (to be codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7). The act is simple and precise:
DEFINITION OF "MARRIAGE" AND "SPOUSE." In determining the meaning of
any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the various
administrative bureaus and agencies of the United States, the word "marriage"
means only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife,
and the word "spouse" refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a hus-
band or a wife.
Id.
16. See Reske, supra note 14, at 32 (discussing avenues for constitutional challenge on
the full-faith issue). The Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, which is cocounsel
in the Baehr v. Miike case, has already announced its intention to pursue a constitutional
challenge. Todd S. Purdum, Heat on Clinton for Gay Marriage Ruling, S.F. EXAMINER,
Sept. 22, 1996, at A2. The prospects for such a challenge were considerably strengthened
earlier this year when the U.S. Supreme Court declared that legislation motivated by antip-
athy toward gay men and lesbians could not survive even rational basis review under the
Equal Protection Clause. Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1627-29 (1996).
17. See infra Part IV.
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and the Defense of Marriage Act is completed, and even if it is ulti-
mately determined that states would not owe full faith and credit to
Hawaii same-sex marriages, uniform federal recognition would pro-
vide a simple, predictable, and litigation-free resolution to the prob-
lem of dealing with marriages that may be recognized in some states
but not in others. Finally, federal recognition would serve important
federal policies by avoiding the revival of the long-settled issues of
income-splitting and taxation of marital property transfers cconcern-
ing the interaction of federal taxation law and state marital property
law. The Defense of Marriage Act, at least as currently drafted,
would not prevent the resurgence of these important problems.
Part I will summarize the tax benefits conferred on married
couples by the Internal Revenue Code. Part II will discuss the legisla-
tive history of Code provisions that recognize marital status and how
they reveal congressional intent to defer to state-law determinations.
Part III will review past administrative and judicial attempts to resolve
conflicting determinations of marital status. Finally, Part IV will ex-
plain why federal and state policies will best be served by recognition
of same-sex marriages under the federal taxation laws and why the
Defense of Marriage Act will thwart long-standing policy goals.
I. Advantages of Marriage to Federal Taxpayers
The lay person who is familiar with the so-called "marriage pen-
alty"18 may wonder why the betrothed gay or lesbian taxpayer would
18. As the Tax Court once explained:
A married couple filing a joint return is taxed on their total combined in-
come and, as for all taxpayers, the marginal tax rate increases as total income
increases. Reflecting income splitting enacted in 1948, the rate schedule for mar-
ried couples filing jointly is somewhat lower than it is for single persons. Conse-
quently, if one partner of the marriage produces all or most of the income, he or
she pays less tax than if single. However, if both spouses work, the second in-
come is piled on the first, and is thus in a higher marginal tax bracket than if it
stood alone. Because the higher tax bracket can more than.negate the lower rate
schedule for couples filing jointly, when two people who earn somewhat compara-
ble salaries decide to marry, they unhappily discover that their total tax bill is
higher than it was before they were wed.
Boyter v. Commissioner, 668 F.2d 1382, 1383 n.1 (1981) (quoting Boyter v. Commissioner,
74 T.C. 989 (1980)).
The marriage penalty has declined in recent years, particularly with the flattening of
tax brackets under the Internal Revenue Code of 1986. For example, under the 1993 rates,
a single taxpayer with a taxable income of $50,000 would pay $11,127.00 in federal income
tax, while a married individual filing separately with the same taxable income would pay
$11,764.25, for a "penalty" of $637.25. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993
(Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993) § 13201(a)-(c), Pub. L. No. 103-66, 1993
U.S.C.C.A.N. (107 Stat.) 312, 457-61 (codified at I.R.C. § 1 (1994)). However, married
taxpayers with the same gross income as their single counterparts typically have more dis-
posable income because of their ability to share necessary expenses; they are thus more
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voluntarily seek to have the Internal Revenue Service recognize the
marriage at all. The answer is that for most taxpayers, the financial
benefits of married status far outweigh the cost of the marriage pen-
alty.19 Legally married taxpayers can transfer property and wealth to
each other completely free of income, estate, and gift taxes.20 They do
not incur income taxes when they take advantage of certain fringe
benefits offered by their spouses' employers, 21 such as health insur-
likely to be able to reduce their taxable income by itemizing deductions, such as for home
mortgage interest, state and local taxes, charitable contributions, medical expenses, and
retirement savings. See I.R.C. §§ 163(h), 164, 170, 213, 219 (1994); see also Jennifer Stein-
hauer, Studies Find Big Benefits in Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1995, at A8 (citing
sociological research showing that "married couples were generally more financially well
off than couples who simply lived together, because they were much more likely to pool
money and invest in the future than were couples who merely cohabitated").
19. See Patricia A. Cain, Same-Sex Couples and the Federal Tax Laws, 1 LAW & SEXU-
ALITY 97, 98-99 (1991). I am indebted to Professor Cain for her summary of the benefits,
on which I draw heavily in this Part. See also Adam Chase, Tax Planning for Same-Sex
Couples, 72 DENVER U. L. REV. 359 (1995); Philip S. Home, Challenging Public- and Pri-
vate-Sector Benefit Schemes Which Discriminate Against Unmarried Opposite-Sex and
Same-Sex Partners, 4 LAw & SEXUALITY 35 (1994); Lawrence Zelenak, Marriage and the
Income Tax, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 339 (1994); Sue Nussbaum Averill, Comment, Desperately
Seeking Status: Same-Sex Couples Battle for Employment-Linked Benefits, 27 AKRON L.
REV. 253 (1993).
20. Virtually all transfers of property are treated as gifts for purposes of income taxa-
tion. I.R.C. § 1041(a)-(b) (1994). Gifts are excluded from gross income, and thus from
taxable income. I.R.C. §§ 61, 63, 102(a) (1994). Moreover, gifts and bequests to spouses
are fully deductible for purposes of gift and estate taxation. I.R.C. §§ 2056(a), 2523(a)
(1994).
21. Some employers choose to offer these benefits to same-sex partners of their em-
ployees, and some employees choose to take them despite the additional tax incurred.
There are now more than four hundred employers that offer domestic partnership benefits,
according to the consulting firm Common Ground. Arthur S. Leonard, Domestic Partner-
ship & Marriage Notes, 1995 LESBIAN/GAY L. NoTEs 168, 168; see also Steven Briggs,
Domestic Partners and Family Benefits: An Emerging Trend, 45 LAB. L.J. 749 (1994).
The tax incurred can be substantial. In the five published private letter rulings on the
subject, the Internal Revenue Service has consistently maintained that the imputed value
of any fringe benefit constitutes "wages" that are subject to income tax (paid by the em-
ployee), FUTA (federal unemployment tax paid by the employer), and FICA (Social Se-
curity tax paid by both employer and employee). Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-03-011 (Jan. 19, 1996)
(health insurance benefits); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-31-017 (May 4, 1994) (tuition reduction bene-
fits); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-31-062 (May 7, 1992) (health insurance benefits provided by munici-
pality; not addressing FICA or FUTA); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-09-060 (Dec. 6, 1990) (health
insurance benefits; declining to discuss FUTA because the employer was a municipality
exempt from FUTA); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-34-048 (May 29, 1990) (health insurance benefits).
Although significant, these tax costs can be offset by other considerations. Employers
should have no difficulty deducting the cost of domestic partner benefits from their own
income taxes under the broad provision for "all the ordinary and necessary expenses [for]
carrying on any trade or business, including... a reasonable allowance for salaries or other
compensation .... " I.R.C. § 162 (1994).
For employees, the tax costs of a benefit may be significantly cheaper than purchasing
the same service on the open market, as I know from personal experience. While in law
1600 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 47
ance,22 tuition discounts offered by educational institutions, meals
and lodging,24 employee discounts,25 and reimbursements for moving
expenses,26 which together form a significant proportion of employee
compensation. 27 Spouses can take a one-time exclusion of $125,000 of
the gain from the sale of a jointly owned principal residence if at least
school, I was covered by the group health plan and vision plans of my husband's employer,
for which he paid additional tax of more than one-third of the imputed income. An
equivalent individual health plan would have cost us at least three to four times as much as
the additional tax, and was significantly cheaper than even the reduced-rate, bare-bones
student health plan I would otherwise have been required to purchase. Moreover, group
plans typically allow enrollment without screening for preexisting conditions; many people
would not be able to find an equivalent individual plan at any price because of such
screening.
22. See I.R.C. §§ 105, 106 (1994).
23. See I.R.C. § 117(d) (1994).
24. See I.R.C. § 119 (1994).
25. See i.R.C. § 132(a)(1)-(2), (b), (c), (h)(2) (1994).
26. See I.R.C. §§ 132(g), 217 (1994). Although exclusion of moving expense reim-
bursement from gross income is technically available for moving expenses of any individual
who shares the employee's old and new residences "and is a member of the taxpayer's
household," § 217(b)(2), employers often refuse to cover half the moving expense of a
lesbian or gay employee with a domestic partner. See, e.g., Arthur S. Leonard, Domestic
Partnership Notes, 1995 LESBIAN/GAY L. NOTES 71,71-72 (reporting that the U.S. Depart-
ment of the Interior approved only half of an employee's otherwise eligible expenses in
purchasing a new home because her same-sex domestic partner, with whom she purchased
the new home, was not recognized as her spouse).
Moreover, the Commissioner might conceivably attempt to deny the exclusion for the
expenses attributable to an employee's gay or lesbian partner. The Commissioner might
contend that congressional intent in using the phrase "member of the taxpayer's house-
hold" was to exclude any person whose relationship to the taxpayer violates local law (such
as laws against sodomy or fornication) as violative of public policy. The Commissioner
successfully took just such a position in the case of a taxpayer who attempted to take a
dependency exemption for a woman with whom he lived in an adulterous relationship as a
member of his household under I.R.C. § 152(a)(9). Turnipseed v. Commissioner, 27 T.C.
758 (1957); see infra notes 82-92 and accompanying text. Congress ratified this decision by
enacting I.R.C. § 152(b)(5) (1994), which excludes from the definition of "household" any
person whose relationship with the taxpayer violates local law. See infra notes 93-101 and
accompanying text.
Of course, this argument carries little force in the jurisdictions that have decriminal-
ized sodomy and fornication. Moreover, § 152(b)(5) applies only to the definition of "de-
pendent" claimed under § 152(a)(9), both by the express language of the statute and by the
legislative history. H.R. REP. No. 775, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8 (1957). By contrast,
§ 217(b) specially defines its beneficiaries so as to exclude some dependents (such as a
college student whose principal abode is at the campus) and to include some
nondependents (such as an elderly or infirm relative of independent financial means who
cart no longer care for himself).
27. Private-sector employee benefits account for more than 27% of total compensa-
tion; insurance plans alone account for 6% of total compensation. BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, EMPLOYmENT COST INDEXES AND LEvELs 1975-89, at 9
(1989).
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one spouse is over the age of 55.28 Divorcing spouses can divide their
property without adverse tax consequences, 29 and they can choose in
advance which spouse will pay taxes on alimony payments.30 In some
cases, the joint return produces a tax savings.31 Despite the marriage
penalty and the minimal additional tax costs of joint filing,32 most tax-
payers would readily file jointly in order to receive these benefits.
II. Congressional Intent to Defer to State-Law
Determinations of Domestic Relations
For more than eighty years, Congress has given nearly exclusive
control over access to the tax benefits of marriage to the states,
through their regulation of marriage.3 3 As the burden of federal in-
come taxation has increased, Congress has gradually added provisions
to the tax laws that regulate the recognition of marriage for tax pur-
poses. However, every aspect of congressional regulation relates
either to the timing of changes in marital status or to the recognition
of community property interests; at no time before 1996 has Congress
ever refused to recognize a state-law determination of marital status.
34
Analysis of these ad hoc provisions reveals a consistent congressional
28. See I.R.C. § 121 (1994).
29. See I.R.C. § 1041(a)-(c) (1994).
30. See I.R.C. §§ 71, 215 (1994). Typically, the payor spouse lists the alimony pay-
ments as an itemized deduction; the payee spouse must then include the payments as taxa-
ble income. Since the spouse receiving alimony is usually in a lower tax bracket than the
spouse who pays it, these provisions allow the divorcing spouses to reduce their combined
tax liability, thus allowing the payor spouse to make larger payments.
31. The tax savings is produced when one spouse has a substantially higher income
than the other, such as when only one spouse has taxable income. By splitting their in-
comes, part of the higher-earning spouse's income is shifted for tax purposes to the lower-
earning spouse, to be taxed at his lower marginal rate. See Boyter v. Commissioner, 668
F.2d 1382, 1383 n.1 (1981) (quoting Boyter v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 989 (1980)); see also
Harvey S. Rosen, The Marriage Tax Is Down but Not Out, 40 NAT'L TAX J. 567, 571 (1987).
The very reason Congress enacted the joint return provisions of the Revenue Act of
1948 was to allow residents of common-law states to use income-splitting when it is advan-
tageous, as residents of community property states had been able to do since at least 1930.
See S. REP. No. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 22-29 (1948), reprinted in 1948
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1163, 1184-91; see also Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101, 118 (1930) (allowing
income-splitting in community property states).
32. The additional tax costs of marriage are purely hypothetical for most taxpayers.
See Cain, supra note 19, at 98-99. They include "(1) joint and several tax liability on a joint
return; (2) the inability to recognize losses on sales between spouses; and (3) numerous tax
attribution rules that treat spouses as a unitary taxpayer." Id. (footnotes omitted).
33. This deference ended, of course, with the enactment of the Defense of Marriage
Act on September 21, 1996. Pub. L. No. 104-199 (1996) (to be codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7, 28
U.S.C. § 1738C); see infra subpart IV.A.
34. The exception, again, was this year's passage of the Defense of Marriage Act,
which was intended to apply to the entire realm of federal law. Id. sec. 3 (to be codified at
1 U.S.C. § 7).
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intent to give the greatest possible deference to regulation of marriage
by the states.
A. Timing of Personal Exemptions
When Congress enacted the first modem income tax in 1913,35 it
barely recognized marital status at all. The 1913 act levied a one per-
cent tax on an individual's "net income" (analogous to today's "taxa-
ble income"). 36 The 1913 act had simple provisions for itemized
deductions and for exclusions from gross income.37 It allowed a per-
sonal exemption of $3,000 for an unmarried individual, while married
couples had to share a $4,000 exemption, regardless of whether one or
both spouses had sufficient separate income to be required to file a
return.3 8 The act referred to "husband" and "wife" without defining
the terms;39 Congress apparently found it self-evident that marital sta-
tus would be determined exclusively under state law.40 Congress pre-
served this structure when it revised the income tax laws to increase
revenues for World War I.41
35. Act of Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 176, 38 Stat. 114.
36. Id. § II(A)(1), 38 Stat. at 166. A more progressive "additional tax" applied to net
incomes exceeding $20,000. Id. § II(A)(2), 38 Stat. at 166.
37. Id § II(B), 38 Stat. at 167-68.
38. Id. § H(C), 38 Stat. at 168. The act refers to a "deduction" rather than an "exemp-
tion," the term used in later acts and in the present Internal Revenue Code. There was no
provision for joint returns.
39. Id
40. Floor debates on the bill did not directly address the issue at all. Section II(C)
was approved without debate during the reading of the bill on the floor of the house. 50
CONG. REc. 1236 (1913). There was only brief commentary on the size of the exemptions.
50 CONG. Rnc. 1247 (1913) (statement of Rep. Gillett). The only remotely relevant
amendment, which was defeated and was likely offered more as a political statement than
as a serious proposal, would have relieved women from all income taxation whatsoever if
they resided in states that denied them the right to vote. 50 CONG. Rc. 1255-57 (state-
ments of Rep. La Follette and Rep. Heflin).
Otherwise, hearing testimony and floor debates did not address the issue of marital
status at all; most of the testimony and debates concerned the tariff provisions of the bill.
Tariff Schedules: Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 2 of the Senate Comm. on Finance on
H.R. 3321, 63d Cong., 1st Sess. 336-37 (1913); Tariff Schedules: Briefs and Statements Filed
with the Senate Comm. on Finance on H.R. 3321, 63d Cong., 1st Sess. 1955-2142 (1913); 50
CONG. REc. 1236-64, 1299-1311, 5678-81 (1913) (House floor debates); id. at 3766-76, 3805-
22, 3829-90, 4379-81, 4416-20, 4611-13 (1913) (Senate floor debates). (Testimony before
the House Ways and Means Committee was not preserved.)
41. The Revenue Act of 1916 increased the tax rates, but otherwise left the structure
of the 1913 act in place. Act of Sept. 8, 1916 (Revenue Act of 1916), ch. 463, § 1, 39 Stat.
756, 756-57. Again, the vast majority of the hearing testimony was on the tariff provisions
of the act; only one witness testified on the income tax. To Increase the Revenue: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Finance on H.R. 16763, 64th Cong., 1st Sess.
287-97 (1916) (testimony of Rep. Elston). The only remotely relevant floor debate con-
cerned whether to have a separate personal exemption for each family member rather than
a flat exemption for a married couple, and whether to allow the full exemption for taxpay-
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The Revenue Act of 192142 created a need for more scrutiny of
marital status. Unlike the previous tax laws, the 1921 Revenue Act
gave some married taxpayers a higher personal exemption than they
would have enjoyed if single.43 Along with the higher exemption,
Congress enacted the first timing provision: marital status would be
determined as of the last day of the taxable year; moreover, taxpayers
who were widowed during the year were permitted to take the higher
marital exemption.44 The timing provision came at the request of the
Treasury Department, which reportedly had adhered to this policy de-
spite the lack of statutory authority.45 After three years, Congress
ers who were widowed during the tax year. 53 CONG. REC. 13099 (1916) (statement of Sen.
Sherman); id. at 13266-69 (1916) (statements of Sen. Underwood, Sen. Oliver, Sen. Wil-
liams, Sen. O'Gorman, Sen. Thomas, and Sen. Stone).
The Revenue Act of 1917 imposed a surtax with lower personal exemptions. Act of
Oct. 3, 1917 (Revenue Act of 1917), ch. 63, §§ 1-3, 40 Stat. 300, 300-01. It softened the
blow by adding a $200 exemption for each dependent child. Id. § 1203, 40 Stat. at 331. The
only hearing testimony on the income tax concerned taxation of stock dividends; other-
wise, the testimony mostly concerned war expenses. Revenue to Defray War Expenses:
Hearings and Briefs Before the Sen. Comm. on Finance on H.R. 4280, 65th Cong., 1st Sess.
1-30 (1917). Floor debates only occasionally addressed the reduction in personal exemp-
tions, the major change for individual taxpayers. 55 CONG. REC. 2398-2401 (1917) (state-
ment of Rep. Stafford et al.); id. at 4536-39 (statements of Rep. Sterling, Rep. Cannon, and
Rep. Hardy).
The principal innovation of the Revenue Act of 1918 (actually enacted in early 1919)
was the joint return. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 223,40 Stat. 1057, 1074 (1919). Unlike
the present-day joint return, the 1919 joint return was little more than a convenience; the
aggregate income was taxed at the same rate as an individual's income of the same level.
Id. Again, most of the testimony and floor debates concerned war expenses. See generally
To Provide Revenue for War Purposes: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Finance on
H.R. 12863, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. (1918); 57 CONG. REc. 249-56, 291-312, 386-98, 491-518,
542-72, 609-21, 648-71, 701-23, 734-53, 758-834, 2452-64, 2973-3035, 3117-39, 3179-94, 3265-
71 (1918).
42. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, 42 Stat. 227.
43. Individuals could claim a personal exemption of $1,000. Married couples could
claim a personal exemption of $2,500; however, if their net income exceeded $5,000, the
personal exemption was reduced to $2,000. As under previous laws, husband and wife had
to share the exemption if they filed separate returns. Id. § 216(c), 42 Stat. at 243.
44. Id. § 216(f), 42 Stat. at 243.
45. As Dr. T.S. Adams, a tax advisor to the Treasury Department who had drafted
§ 216(f), testified to the Senate Finance Committee:
We have no rule under existing law as to what happens if a man has a child born
during the year, or if he dies during the year. We have been using this rule [refer-
ring to proposed § 216(f)]. There has been no law for it, and we thought we had
better get it in the statute.
Internal Revenue: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Finance on H.R. 8245, 67th Cong.,
1st Sess. 64 (1921) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 8245]. This provision was apparently
considered so trivial that it was not even mentioned in the committee reports on the bill. S.
REP. No. 275, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1921) (discussing other provisions in § 216); H.R.
REP. No. 350, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1921) (omitting any mention of the provision, then
numbered as § 222).
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amended the timing provision to prorate the higher marital exemption
for the portion of the taxable year in which the taxpayer was married,
out of a professed concern for faimess.46 Widows and widowers were
still permitted to claim the marital exemption for the entire taxable
year.47
For several decades, Congress left the prorated marital exemp-
tion virtually unchanged despite regular updates to the tax statutes
and the enactment of the first Internal Revenue Code in 1939.48 In
1943 Congress dropped the proration provision, authorizing the mari-
tal exemption for couples married as of July 1 of the taxable year.49
Finally, in 1944, Congress revived the year-end determination that it
had originally enacted in 1921.50 The same statute created the stan-
dard deduction, with a nearly identical provision for year-end recogni-
Interestingly, another provision allowed to nonresident aliens only a $1,000 exemption
with no additional exemptions for spouse or dependents. Revenue Act of 1921 § 216(e);
Hearings on H.R. 8245, supra, at 63, 240-41; S. REP. No. 275, supra, at 15-16. Dr. Adams
supported this provision largely because "[w]e have no test of the veracity of the foreign
citizen. We can not tell whether he has 10 children or 4 children, or whether he is unmar-
ried or living with his wife." Hearings on H.R. 8245, supra, at 63. He thus was not con-
cerned about determining marital status as such.
A minor change was also made to clarify that filing of joint returns was optional; it was
approved without debate in the Senate. Revenue Act of 1921 § 223(b); Hearings on H.R.
8245, supra, at 74 (testimony of Dr. Adams); S. REP. No. 275, supra, at 17; H.R. REP. No.
350, supra, at 13; 61 CONG. REc. 5955 (1921).
46. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 216(c), (f)(2), 43 Stat. 253, 272-73. This change
was made on the floor of the Senate at the behest of the Finance Committee without any
debate at all. 65 CONG. REc. 7127 (1924). The Finance Committee's report on the bill
explained only that the change was "obviously a more equitable rule than that provided in
the existing law whereby the amount of these credits [sic] is determined by the status of the
taxpayer on a single day rather than during the entire taxable period." S. REP. No. 398,
68th Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1924). The House agreed to the change without significant com-
ment in its conference report. H.R. REP. No. 844, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1924).
47. Revenue Act of 1924 § 216(c), (0(3), 43 Stat. at 272-73.
48. See Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, sec. 131, § 25(b)(1), 56 Stat. 798, 827-28; Reve-
nue Act of 1940, ch. 419, sec. 6, § 25(b)(1), 54 Stat. 516, 519; Internal Revenue Code of
1939, ch. 2, § 25(b), 53 Stat. 1, 18 (repealed 1954); Revenue Act of 1936, ch. 690, § 25(b), 49
Stat. 1648, 1670; Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 25(b), 48 Stat. 680, 693; Revenue Act of
1932, ch. 207, § 25(c), (e), 47 Stat. 169, 184; Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 25(c), (e)(2)-
(3), 45 Stat. 791, 803; Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 216(c), (f)(2)-(3), 44 Stat. 9, 27-28.
Beginning with the Revenue Act of 1932, the dependent exemption was prorated as
well. Internal Revenue Code of 1939 § 25(b), 53 Stat. at 18; Revenue Act of 1936 § 25(b),
49 Stat. at 1670; Revenue Act of 1934 § 25(b), 48 Stat. at 693; Revenue Act of 1932 § 25(e),
47 Stat. at 184.
49. Revenue Act of 1943, ch. 63, sec. 103, § 25(b)(3), 58 Stat. 21, 31. Dependent ex-
emptions fell under the same rule.
50. Individual Income Tax Act of 1944, ch. 210, sec. 10, § 25(b)(2), 58 Stat. 231, 238.
Dependent exemptions were available whenever the taxpayer had provided more than half
of the dependent's support, but for the first time were restricted to specified relatives of
the taxpayer and expressly excluded alimony payments to "a wife." Id. sec. 10, § 25(b)(3),
58 Stat. at 239.
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tion of marital status and an additional requirement that the spouses
live together.51
None of these statutes, including the major revisions in 1921,
1924, 1939, and 1943 and a dozen other regular revisions, placed any
condition other than timing and cohabitation on the recognition of
marital status.
B. The Community Property Problem
The first real challenge to the congressional design came from
taxpayers in the community property states.5 2 Relying on the commu-
nity property doctrine that each spouse has a vested, undivided one-
half interest in all income and property acquired by either spouse dur-
ing the marriage, married residents of community property states be-
gan to file tax returns showing half the community income on each
spouse's return, even when only one spouse earned most or all of the
income (as was most common at the time).5 3 Because of the increas-
ingly progressive tax rates in place by the 1920s, this income-splitting
produced a substantial tax savings for married couples in community
property states that was unavailable to those in other states.54
For three decades, Congress struggled with the community prop-
erty problem. Throughout this period, Congress acknowledged that
no solution was permissible unless it respected the community prop-
erty system, which was an integral part of the regulation of marriage
in the community property states and was much older than the federal
income tax. The first attempt at a solution came in 1921, when a pro-
vision that would have taxed community income to the husband alone
was defeated.5 5 Congress took no further action until 1926 despite the
51. Id. sec. 9, § 23(aa)(4), 58 Stat. at 237.
52. The eight community property states are Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana,
Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, and Washington. S. Rrn'. No. 1013, supra note 31, pt. 1, at 23
n.8 (1948), 1948 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1185 n.8.
53. The Attorney General concluded in 1920 and 1921 that this method of income
splitting was legal in every community property state except California, where state courts
had held that the wife's interest did not vest until the termination of the community by
dissolution or the husband's death. T.D. 3138 (1921), reprinted in 61 CONrG. REc. 5909,
5912-13 (1921) (applying to the states other than Texas); T.D. 3071 (1920), reprinted in 61
CONrG. REc. 6584-88 (1921) (applying to Texas); see also Spreckels v. Spreckels, 158 P. 537,
539 (Cal. 1916) (holding that the husband during the marriage was "the sole and exclusive
owner of all the community property, and that the wife had no title thereto, nor interest
therein, other than a mere expectancy as heir, if she survived him").
54. See, e.g., H.R. RmP. No. 350, supra note 45, at 11 (report of the Ways and Means
Committee); 61 CONG. REC. 5919 (1921) (statement of Sen. Smoot).
55. As originally drafted by the House Ways and Means Committee, section 208 of
the Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, 42 Stat. 227, would have taxed community income to
"the spouse having the management and control of the community property" (i.e., the
husband). H. REP. No. 350, supra note 45, at 11; 61 CONG. REC. 5292 (1921) (statement of
Rep. Black of Texas). The Treasury Department supported the proposal. Hearings on
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urging of Treasury Secretary Andrew W. Mellon to enact the provi-
sion that had been rejected in 1921.56 From 1926 to 1930, Congress
enacted legislation intended to preserve the status quo until the
Supreme Court could decide the issue.57 The legislative impasse was
H.R. 8245, supra note 45, at 231. There was scant debate of the provision on the floor of
the House because the Rules Committee prohibited amendments unless offered by the
majority of the Ways and Means Committee, rendering debate futile. 61 CONG. REC. 5292-
93 (1921) (statements of Rep. Black and Rep. Green of Iowa, the floor manager from the
Ways and Means Committee). There was vigorous opposition on the floor of the Senate,
where members from community property states characterized the provision as an "at-
tempt to overthrow the community-property system," and as "reckless disregard of the
statutes of eight states [which] are attempted to be repealed." 61 CONG. RFc. 5909, 5914
(1921) (statements of Sen. Ashurst of Arizona); see also idt at 5917-22 (statements of Sen.
Broussard of Louisiana); id. at 6872-77 (statement of Sen. Randsell of Louisiana). After
initially voting to accept the provision, the Senate finally voted to delete it so that it could
be reconsidered in th conference committee with the House, upon the acquiescence of the
chair of the Finance Committee. 61 CONG. Rc. 5922, 7229 (1921) (statements of Sen.
Broussard and Sen. Penrose). The House agreed to delete the provision, which surpris-
ingly generated no further debate in the House or the Senate when the conference report
was approved. 61 CONG. Rc. 8020 (1921) (statement of the House managers); id. at 8113
(statement of Sen. Simmons).
Interestingly, there had been no opposition in the Finance Committee from Senator
Jones of New Mexico, who seemed to be unaware that he represented a community prop-
erty state and made no comment at all either in committee or on the Senate Floor. Hear-
ings on H.R. 8245, supra note 45, at 2, 231,283-86; 61 CONG. REc. 5914 (1921).
56. The issue was not raised during the debates on the Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234,
43 Stat. 253, despite the continued urging of Treasury Secretary Andrew W. Mellon to
adopt the proposal that had been rejected in 1921. See 67 CONG. Rec. 551 (1925) (re-
printing a Nov. 10, 1923 letter from Sec. Mellon to Rep. Green); 65 CONG. REc. 2427-73,
2486-2531, 2566-35, 2666-2726, 2775-2800, 2841-2867, 2898-2926, 2948-2974, 2994-3019,
3031,3100-22,3170-99,3257-90,3330-82,3901, 9528-51 (1924) (debates in the House); id. at
6972, 7064, 7072, 7123, 7208, 7337-64, 7439, 7529, 7532, 7594, 7622, 7668, 7691, 7739, 7836,
7838, 7934, 7936-7988, 8011, 8171, 8195, 8454, 8268 9395-9421 (1924) (debates in the
Senate).
57. While Congress was considering the Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, 44 Stat. 9, the
Supreme Court decided the first test case from a community property state, United States
v. Robbins, 269 U.S. 315 (1926). Robbins involved the Commissioner's attempt to tax the
community income of a California couple entirely to the husband under the revenue laws
effective in 1917, increasing their taxes by $6,788.03. Id. at 325. The Court held that be-
cause California law defined the wife's interest as a mere expectancy and not a vested
interest, the income was properly taxed to the husband alone; the Court refused to rule
prospectively what the result would be in the other community property states. Id. at 325-
27. In response, the House-Senate conference committee added a provision to the pending
bill that validated tax returns as actually filed before 1925 by residents of community prop-
erty states in an apparent attempt to preserve the status quo while additional test cases
made their way to the Court. Revenue Act of 1926 § 1212,44 Stat. at 130. There was little
debate of the provision before final passage. See 67 CONG. REC. 4422 (statement of Rep.
Barbour of California).
Congress had to wait more than four years for the Court to act. When the Court did
act, it again refused to decide the real issue, ruling instead only that a California couple
could not achieve income-splitting by contracting with each other to grant the vested joint
interests that California community property law did not provide. Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S.
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only intensified by the Court's 1930 decisions in Poe v. Seabom that
the Revenue Acts gave the Commissioner of Internal Revenue no
power to tax community income as if it were the wage-earner's
alone,58 and in Lucas v. Earl that residents of common-law states
could not, by contract or otherwise, similarly split their income.59
Congress took no further action for twelve years after the deci-
sions in Earl and Seaborn,60 until economic changes forced the issue.
Rising federal taxes brought about by New Deal programs and the
costs of World War II made the difference in tax burdens between
common-law and community property jurisdictions too great to ig-
111, 113-15 (1930). Shortly thereafter, when Congress next revised the revenue laws, it
continued to omit the proposal to expressly tax community income to the husband. Reve-
nue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 22(a), 45 Stat. 791, 797. Because the Treasury Department was
holding 100,000 returns for calendar years 1927 and 1928 for residents of the other commu-
nity property states, Congress also enacted a joint resolution to extend the statute of limi-
tations until the Court adjudicated the question. Act of June 16, 1930, Pub. Res. No. 88, 46
Stat. 589, 589; H.R. REP. No. 1608, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 1-4 (1930).
The long-awaited decision finally came in Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930). In
Seaborn, the Court held that a couple from the State of Washington could split their in-
come because the community property law of that state gave both spouses equal and
vested interests in the community property. Id. at 108-11, 118. The Court also held that
Congress's repeated refusal to adopt the proposed community property provision evinced
an intent to adopt the Attorney General's construction of the Revenue Acts, which was
that residents of community property states other than California were entitled to income-
splitting. Id. at 114-16; see T.D. 3138 (1921), reprinted in 61 CONG. REC. 5909. 5912-13
(1921) (applying to the states other than Texas); T.D. 3071 (1920), reprinted in 61 CONG.
REC. 6584-88 (1921) (applying to Texas).
58. Seaborn, 282 U.S. at 112-13, 118.
59. Earl, 281 U.S. at 114-15. The Earls resided in California, the only community
property state whose courts had construed the wife's interest in community property to be
a mere expectancy rather than a vested interest. Because the Earl case concerned tax
years 1920 and 1921, 281 U.S. at 113, the Court did not consider the 1927 statutory revision
declaring the interests of the spouses to be "present, existing, and equal." Act of Apr. 28,
1927, ch. 265, 1927 Cal. Stat. 484 (presently codified as CAL. FAM. CODE § 751 (West 1995).
That provision was motivated by the desire to obtain the benefits of income-splitting for
California taxapyers. See William A. Reppy, Retroactivity of the 1975 Community Property
Reforms, 48 S. CAL. L. REv. 977, 1089 (1978). In any case, the California Supreme Court
had declared that the new statute could not be applied retroactively to community prop-
erty acquired before 1927. Stewart v. Stewart, 269 P. 439, 442 (1928).
The Court glossed over its decision in Earl when it decided Seaborn later the same
year. Presumably, the Court was concerned in Earl that a contrary result would allow
high-earning taxpayers in every state to split their income among an indefinite number of
nonworking dependents (such as a spouse, children, or elderly dependents), thus rendering
the entire income tax unworkable. Cf. 61 CONG. REc. 5918 (1921) (statement of Sen.
Smoot during debate on the Revenue Act of 1921 raising a similar specter). Community
property law split the income only in half.
60. In the intervening years, Congress enacted several revisions and an important
codification of the revenue laws that continued to ignore the community property problem.
Revenue Act of 1940, ch. 419, 54 Stat. 516; Internal Revenue Code of 1939, ch. 2, 53 Stat. 1
(repealed 1954); Revenue Act of 1936, ch. 690, 49 Stat. 1648; Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277,
48 Stat. 680; Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 207, 47 Stat. 169.
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nore. Common-law states, particularly those that bordered on com-
munity property states, began to enact community property laws.
61
In 1942, Congress amended the gift and estate tax provisions of
the new Internal Revenue Code of 1939 to tax the proceeds of life
insurance policies and gifts of community property as if one spouse
(usually the husband) were the sole owner, unless the other spouse
could show that at least part of the insurance policy or the gift had
been purchased with her separate property, or with property "re-
ceived as compensation for personal services actually rendered by the
[other] spouse."62 This law only made things worse by imposing on
residents of community property states an onerous "tracing" require-
ment to keep documentary proof of community ownership of their
assets, which they might have acquired long before the enactment of
this law in.1942.63 Moreover, in some cases the estate tax exceeded
50% of the decedent's gross estate; if the decedent willed his one-half
interest in the community property to someone other than the surviv-
ing spouse, the surviving spouse had to pay part of the estate tax out
of her own one-half interest in the community property, despite re-
ceiving nothing from the estate itself.64 Finally, the 1942 Revenue Act
did nothing to solve the income-splitting problem.65 This led five
common-law states to adopt community property laws by 1947, de-
spite the extreme difficulty of the transition from the common-law
system.66
Congress finally reached a lasting solution in 1948 when, as part
of a major postwar tax reduction, it authorized married residents of
every state to split their incomes.67 At the same time, it repealed the
flawed community property provisions of the Revenue Act of 1942,
61. Oklahoma passed the first such law in 1939, concerned about the flight of higher-
earning taxpayers to neighboring Texas, New Mexico, and Louisiana. See S. REP. No.
1013, supra note 31, pt. 1, at 24, 1948 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1186. Since the Oklahoma law
allowed couples to take on community status voluntarily (if irrevocably), the Supreme
Court held that it was not effective to split a married couple's income. See Commissioner
v. Harmon, 323 U.S. 44,44-45 (1944). Undeterred, Oklahoma enacted a mandatory com-
munity property law in 1945. Oregon, Michigan, Nebraska, and Pennsylvania followed suit
in 1947; however, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held the community property law un-
constitutional. See S. REP. No. 1013, supra note 31, pt. 1, at 24, 1948 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1186.
62. Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, sec. 404, § 811(g)(4), 56 Stat. 798, 945 (life insur-
ance proceeds); id. sec. 453, § 1000(d), 56 Stat. at 953 (gifts of community property).
63. S. REP. No. 1013, supra note 31, pt. 1, at 26, 1948 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1188-89. This
provision was in direct conflict with the longstanding presumption in community property
states that an asset acquired during the marriage was community property unless it could
be traced to separate property (Le, acquisition by gift or inheritance). See GAIL BOREMAN
BnrD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CALIFORNIA ComlvuIrrY PROPERTY 60 (1994).
64. S. REP. No. 1013, supra note 31, pt. 1, at 26-27, 1948 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1188-89.
65. Id. pt 1., at 24, 1948 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1186.
66. Id.
67. Revenue Act of 1948, ch. 168, sec. 301, § 12(d), 62 Stat. 110, 114.
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replacing them with provisions for "gift-splitting" and for a 100%
marital deduction under the estate and gift taxes.68
Congress made this massive change in the taxation of marital
property with virtually no change in the recognition of marital status;
the Revenue Act of 1948 changed prior law only by explicitly provid-
ing that divorce and legal separation under a court decree would
render a taxpayer single for tax purposes.69 As with the changes in
personal exemptions over the years, congressional actions reveal a
consistent intent to defer to the marital regulation provided by state
law.
70
C. Modern Statutory Provisions for Determination of Marital Status
A number of other provisions of the Internal Revenue Code also
demonstrate a consistent congressional intent to defer to state-law de-
terminations of marital status. First, the Revenue Act of 1934 in-
cluded the first provision for nonrecognition of losses on transactions
between a taxpayer and a member of the taxpayer's family.71 The def-
inition clause of the new provision provided only that "the family of
an individual shall include.., his... spouse. '72
Second, in 1942 Congress provided divorced couples with the op-
tion of choosing which spouse would pay the income tax on alimony
payments.73 At the same time, Congress added a new, purely seman-
tic provision defining the terms "wife" and "husband" to include the
terms "former wife" and "former husband. '74 This provision persists
without material change in the current code.75
Finally, the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 established joint and
several liability for both spouses when filing an incorrect or fraudulent
joint return. 76 There was no definition of marital status for purposes
of filing joint returns until 1943. 77 The language of this definition par-
alleled the language of the provision for marital personal exemp-
tions.78 The language of both provisions was amended into essentially
68. Id. secs. 301-374, 62 Stat. at 116-28.
69. Id. secs. 201,302(c), 303, §§ 23(aa)(6), 25(b)(2), 51(b)(5), 62 Stat. at 113, 115, 116.
70. Once again, this consistency was broken only this year by the Defense of Marriage
Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199 (1996).
71. Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 24(a)(6), 48 Stat. 680, 691.
72. Id. § 24(a)(6)(D), 48 Stat. at 691.
73. Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, sec. 120(a)-(c), §§ 22(k), 23(u), 171, 56 Stat. 798,
816-18. Since the spouse receiving alimony is usually in a lower tax bracket that the spouse
who pays it, these provisions allowed the divorcing spouses to reduce their combined tax
liability.
74. Id. sec. 120(g), § 3797(a)(17), 56 Stat. at 818.
75. I.R.C. § 7701(a)(17) (1994).
76. Internal Revenue Code of 1939, ch. 2, § 51(b), 53 Stat. 1, 27 (repealed 1954).
77. Revenue Act of 1943, ch. 63, sec. 105(a), § 51(f), 58 Stat. 21, 31.
78. Id. sec. 103, § 25(b)(3), 58 Stat. at 31.
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its modem form in 1948, when a similar provision was added for the
new standard deduction.79 According to committee reports, Congress
intended these provisions, as well as the alimony provision, to be con-
strued uniformly nationwide.80 The provisions appear without mate-
rial change in the present Internal Revenue Code.81
D. "Relationships in Violation of Local Law": The Turnipseed Case
, Congressional intent to defer to the domestic relations laws of the
states was perhaps most clearly illuminated by Congress's reaction to
the curious case of Turnipseed v. Commissioner.8 In 1954, when Con-
gress enacted a major revision of the Internal Revenue Code,83 it cre-
ated a new category of personal exemption for any person who was "a
member of the taxpayer's household" and "over half of whose support
... was received from the taxpayer."84 According to committee re-
ports, Congress expected this provision to be used "most frequently
[for] foster children or children in the home awaiting adoption.",
However, the statutory language was intentionally drafted to allow
the exemption for any individual, "irrespective of the relationship of
79. Revenue Act of 1948, ch. 168, secs. 201, 302(c), 303, §§ 23(aa)(6), 25(b)(2),
51(b)(5), 62 Stat. 110, 113, 115, 116.
80. S. Rm,. No. 1013, supra note 31, pt. 1, at 50, 1948 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1212.
81. See I.R.C. § 7703(a) (1994) (applicable to the standard deduction of § 63 and the
personal and dependent exemptions of 33 151-152). With minor grammatical differences,
the same language determines whether a couple may file a joint return. I.R.C.
§ 6013(d)(1)-(2) (1994).
The current code also has a special provision considering as unmarried certain legally
married but separated individuals who support dependent children, thus entitling them to
the advantageous head-of-household filing status. I.R.C. § 7703(b) (1994). Unlike the
other provisions, however, this special provision has nothing to do with recognition of the
marital relationship; in many or most cases, the other spouse will not have dependent chil-
dren, and thus will be required to file as "married filing separately." See, e.g., Patterson v.
Commissioner, 57 T.C.M. (CCH) 248, 249 (1989) (construing I.R.C. § 143, recodified in
1986 as I.R.C. § 7703).
A few other provisions of the code contain special definitions of marital status to pre-
vent unintended, fraudulent, or duplicative claims of tax credits and exemptions. See
I.R.C. § 21(e)(3) (1994) (for dependent care services credit), § 152(a)(9) (1994) (to prevent
a taxpayer from claiming both the dependent and the spouse exemptions for the same
person).
For a concise history of the difficulties of taxing married couples, see Boyter v. Com-
missioner, 668 F.2d at 1383 n.1 (1981) (quoting Boyter v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 989,991 &
n.1 (1980)). A detailed treatment is available in Boris I. Bittker, Federal Income Taxation
and the Family, 27 STar. L. Rtv. 1389, 1416-44 (1975).
82. 27 T.C. 758 (1957).
83. Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-591, 68A Stat. 3 (repealed 1986)
[hereinafter "I.R.C. of 1954"].
84. Turnipseed, 27 T.C. at 759-60 & n.1 (citing I.R.C. of 1954 § 152(a)(9), 68A Stat. at
44 (current version at I.R.C. § 152(a)(9) (1994))).
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such individual to the taxpayer," as long as the taxpayer provided at
least half the individual's support.
85
Meanwhile, unbeknownst to Congress, Leon Turnipseed and Tina
Johnson "lived openly together as man and wife,"'86 beginning some
time in 1953. Mr. Turnipseed provided all her support, and they had a
child in 1954. So when Mr. Turnipseed filed his 1954 income tax re-
turn, he claimed the new dependent exemption for Ms. Johnson.
87
The problem was that Ms. Johnson was married to another man.
s8
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue disallowed the exemption be-
cause Mr. Turnipseed and Ms. Johnson were "living in adulterous co-
habitation,"89 a crime under Alabama law. 90
The Tax Court upheld the disallowance, despite its conclusion
that every express statutory requirement for the dependency exemp-
tion was satisfied.91 The court put a restrictive gloss on the language
of the statute and the committee reports, opining that "Congress
never intended [the statute] to be construed so literally as to permit a
dependency exemption for an individual maintaining an illicit rela-
tionship in conscious violation of the criminal law."2
Apparently afraid that another adulterous taxpayer might suc-
ceed where Mr. Turnipseed had failed,93 Congress quickly added to
pending legislation a provision that automatically disallowed the ex-
emption if "the relationship between such individual and the taxpayer
is in violation of local law."'94 The House Ways and Means Committee
was apparently unaware of the Turnipseed case until after the Tax
Court filed its decision on February 7, 1957 (coincidentally the same
day that the Ways and Means Committee concluded its hearings on
the pending bill), for there is no mention of the case in the hearing
85. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4621, 4650-51; H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1954), reprinted in 1954
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4017, 4043-44.
86. Turnipseed, 27 T.C. at 759.
87. Id.
88. Id. Ms. Johnson had married David Johnson in 1947. They were separated in
1949, after having two children. Mr. Johnson made only $52 in support payments to his
wife in 1950, and none at all in the succeeding years; Ms. Johnson worked to support the
two children until she moved in with Mr. Turnipseed. Id.
It appears that neither the Tax Court nor Congress was concerned about the misbe-
havior of David Johnson, who today would be characterized as the classic "deadbeat dad."
89. Id. at 760.
90. Id. at 761 n.3 (citing 14 ALA. CODE § 16 (1940)).
91. Id. at 761.
92. Id. at 760.
93. See Ensminger v. Commissioner, 610 F.2d 189, 191 (4th Cir. 1979).
94. Technical Amendments Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-866, § 4(c), 72 Stat. 1606,
1607, reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1925, 1927 (current version at I.R.C. § 152(b)(5)
(1994)).
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transcripts.95 The committee was certainly aware of Turnipseed by the
time it reported the bill to the House on July 9, 1957. By that time the
committee had added a provision clearly intended to adopt the result
in Tumipseed, but it explained the provision vaguely and without ref-
erence to Turnipseed itself or its specific facts:
Some of the more important unintended benefits which this bill
will remove are... the contention that the present definition of a
dependent includes those living in the household of the taxpayer
even though their relationship to the taxpayer is an illegal one ....
On this point it makes clear that a person who is not a close
relative but is living with the taxpayer may not be claimed as a de-
pendent, if the relationship between the taxpayer and the individual
is an illegal one under the applicable local law. For example, this
would make it clear that an individual who is a "common-law wife"
where the applicable State law does not recognize common-law
marriages would not qualify as a dependent of the taxpayer. This
qualification applies only to the definition of a dependent under
section 152(a)(9).
9 6
Although the bill did not become law for more than a year, no
clarifying legislative history was ever developed. Indeed, lawmakers
and Treasury officials seemed afraid to discuss it openly. When the
Senate Committee on Finance held hearings in early 1958, the only
witness who testified about the provision, a deputy secretary of the
Treasury, said tersely that it "stops certain abuses of the dependency
allowance. '97 The Finance Committee's report repeated the vague ex-
planation of the House report almost verbatim.98
Because of the vagueness of this legislative history, the courts
have consistently interpreted the provision in light of the facts of the
Tumipseed case, denying dependent exemptions in cases involving
adultery or even mere cohabitation by unmarried adults. 99 The courts
95. See General Revenue Revision: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and
Means on Topics Pertaining to the General Revision of the Internal Revenue Code, pts. 2 & 3
(1958). Only Thomas C. Atkeson, a professor of taxation at the College of William and
Mary, testified about § 152(a)(9); he opposed its broad language because he felt that the
Internal Revenue Service would not be capable of verifying the eligibility of unrelated
dependents, but did not mention the Turnipseed situation. Id. at 2253, 2255-56.
96. H.R. REP. No. 775, supra note 26, at 2, 7-8.
97. Technical Amendments Act of 1958: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Fi-
nance on H.R. 8381, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1958) (testimony of Deputy Secretary Dan
Throop Smith). In a written statement on the bill, Deputy Secretary Smith described the
provision only slightly less tersely as "exclud[ing] from the definition of a dependent those
living in the household of the taxpayer if their relationship to the taxpayer is an illegal
one." Id. at 54.
98. S. REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 15, 124, reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4791, 4804, 4913.
99. See e.g., Ensminger v. Commissioner, 610 F.2d 189, 190-91 & n.5 (4th Cir. 1979)
(unmarried couple; North Carolina statute banned "lewd and lascivious" cohabitation);
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have been careful to rely on express provisions of local law, with only
rare lapses in dictum.100 Congress has left the language of the "local
law" provision unchanged for more than 35 years, thereby acquiescing
in these interpretations.10'
111. Administrative and Judicial Attempts to Resolve
Conflicting Determinations of Marital Status
Establishing a principle of respect for state-law determinations of
marital status has not eliminated the need to determine whether par-
ticular taxpayers should be considered married. It is perhaps inevita-
ble in a federal system, in which the individual states have authority to
define domestic relationships, that authorities in different states may
come to conflicting conclusions about the marital status of mobile citi-
Peacock v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 177, 178-82 (1978) (unmarried couple; Ari-
zona statute banned "open and notorious cohabitation or adultery"; taxpayers' claim that
their relationship was not "open and notorious" deemed irrelevant); Martin v. Commis-
sioner, 32 T.C.M. (CCH) 656, 657 (1973) (unmarried couple; violation of Alabama, Geor-
gia, and Illinois statutes; finding that requirements for legal common-law marriage were
not met); Eichbauer v. Commissioner, 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 581, 582 (1971) (unmarried
couple; Washington statute punished "[e]very person who shall lewdly and viciously co-
habit with another"; state did not recognize common-law marriages); Untermann v. Com-
missioner, 38 T.C. 93, 93-94, 96-97 (1962) (husband remarried after obtaining void Mexican
divorce; relationship with second wife was thus adulterous); Estate of Buckley v. Commis-
sioner, 37 T.C. 664, 673 (1962) (same). But see Shackelford v. United States (In re Shackel-
ford), 3 B.R. 42, 43-44 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1980) (unmarried cohabitants; dependency
exemption allowed despite statute punishing "open, gross lewdness or lascivious behavior"
because mere cohabitation was neither lewd nor lascivious in contemporary society, and no
evidence before the court demonstrated that the cohabitants had a sexual relationship).
100. The Tax Court has twice cited Turnipseed's restrictive gloss on the catch-all depen-
dency exemption in § 152(a)(9) to assert that it was intended to allow dependent exemp-
tions only for foster children and children awaiting adoption, despite Congress's narrower
restriction in § 152(b)(5), enacted after Turnipseed, that the exemption should be denied
only when there is a relationship in violation of local law. Protiva v. Commissioner, 29
T.C.M. (CCH) 1318, 1820 (1970); Hamilton v. Commissioner, 34 T.C. 927, 929 (1960).
However, Protiva and Hamilton are dictum on this point. In Protiva, the taxpayer claimed
dependent exemptions for the children of his housekeeper, whom he provided with room,
board, and living expenses. Protiva, 29 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1319. In Hamilton, the taxpayer
claimed a dependent exemption for the housekeeper herself, whom he similarly provided
with room, board, and expense money. Hamilton, 34 T.C. at 928. There was no sexual
relationship between the taxpayer and the housekeeper in either case. The Tax Court held
in both cases that the taxpayer's expenses were employment compensation for the house-
keeping services, and not "support" of dependents within the meaning of § 152(a). Pro-
tiva, 29 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1321; Hamilton, 34 T.C. at 929. Since "support" rather than
compensation is required to claim any dependent exemption, the Tax Court's restrictive
interpretation of § 152(a)(9) in these cases was unnecessary to its decisions.
101. Interestingly, Congress made no amendment to the dependent exemption when it
enacted the Defense of Marriage Act.
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zens.10 2 Although the Full Faith and Credit Clause was perhaps in-
tended to solve just such problems by requiring each state to
recognize the others' determinations of marital status, 103 it has not
done so in every case. Furthermore, the courts have often been re-
quired to determine the effect of domestic relations decisions ren-
dered in foreign jurisdictions, which are entitled to mere "comity"
rather than full faith and credit.1°4
The courts have developed a body of case law to address this
problem, which most commonly arose when an unhappily married
person traveled to Nevada, Florida, Mexico, or elsewhere for a quick
divorce that her home state refused to recognize. However, the courts
were unable to agree on a solution before the problem was eliminated
by the liberalization of divorce laws. Nevertheless, the decisions eluci-
date the problems that would be presented by a same-sex marriage
that is recognized by the state that rendered it but not by the state of
the couple's current residence. An examination of these cases demon-
strates that a solution is possible that would best serve the congres-
sional intent to respect local determinations of marital status and to
promote nationally uniform rules of taxation, even if the Full Faith
and Credit Clause does not require the state of residence to respect
the determination in question.
A. Resolution of Conflicting State Determinations of Marital Status
When confronted with confficting state-law determinations of
marital status, the courts and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
have been surprisingly uniform in respecting taxpayers' reliance on
disputed changes in marital status made in states other than the tax-
payers' state of residence. Since 1958, the Commissioner has
respected common-law marriages that are validly contracted in the
taxpayers' original state of residence, even when the taxpayers move
to a state that refuses to recognize the marriage.10 5
102. See, e.g., Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 247 (1945) (Rutledge, J., dis-
senting) (noting that although North Carolina refused to recognize Williams's Nevada di-
vorce and thus convicted him of bigamy for his subsequent Nevada marriage, Nevada
continued to recognize the divorce and remarriage); id. at 265 n.6 (Black, J., dissenting)
(noting that states with miscegenation statutes frequently refused to recognize interracial
marriages that were validly performed in other states).
103. Id. at 254-55 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
104. See, eg., Slessinger v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 835 F.2d 937, 940 &
n.1 (1st Cir. 1987); Montemurro v. INS, 409 F.2d 832, 833 (9th Cir. 1969); Estate of Borax
v. Commissioner, 349 F.2d 666, 670 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 935 (1966); Shikoh
v. Murff, 257 F.2d 306, 308-09 (2d Cir. 1958); Drew v. Hobby, 123 F. Supp. 245, 248
(S.D.N.Y. 1954); Estate of Steffke v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 530, 532 (1975) (citing Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 247.21 (West Cum. Supp. 1974)).
105. Rev. Rul. 58-66, 1958-1 C.B. 60.
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A different issue is presented when an out-of-state divorce is
questionable under the law of the state of residence. However, the
Tax Court has resolved this issue in favor of recognizing the divorce.
In Campbell v. Commissioner,10 6 the Commissioner disallowed the de-
duction claimed by a taxpayer for his alimony payments. Although
the taxpayer and his former wife were New York residents, they ob-
tained a divorce in Florida when the wife traveled there for that sole
purpose with the taxpayer's consent.107 The Commissioner contended
that New York would not recognize the Florida divorce because the
taxpayer's former wife had not acquired domicile in Florida.108 The
Tax Court dismissed this contention, finding that the Florida decree
was a valid basis for the alimony deduction in the absence of a con-
trolling New York determination on the question. 09 In so doing, the
court relied on a congressional committee report stating that the ali-
mony provision was intended to produce "uniformity in the treatment
of... alimony regardless of variance in the laws of different States."" 0
In several later cases, courts have recognized an out-of-state di-
vorce even when the state of residence has declared the divorce void.
In Feinberg v. Commissioner,"' the Commissioner disallowed deduc-
tions for alimony payments made by another unhappily married New
York taxpayer, George Feinberg. 112 George and his wife Anna Fein-
berg had voluntarily separated pursuant to a formal written agree-
ment, under which George would make support payments. Six weeks
later, George commenced a divorce action in Florida, serving the
complaint by publication on Anna, who did not appear. After the de-
cree was granted ex parte, George moved to New Jersey, where he
remarried. 113 Anna then obtained a declaratory judgment from a
New York court that the Florida decree was void, and that she was
still George's spouse.114 The Tax Court upheld the Commissioner's
disallowance of the alimony payment deductions, but the Third Cir-
cuit reversed, relying on a previous determination by the Commis-
sioner that alimony deductions would be allowed for taxpayers who
"'have acted in good faith in relying on [Mexican] divorces"' and "re-
married in reliance upon the foreign decree," even when state courts
might not recognize the decree as valid."15
106. 15 T.C. 355 (1950).
107. Id. at 355-56.
108. Id. at 359.
109. Id. at 359, 361.
110. Id. at 360 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 72 (1942)).
111. 198 F.2d 260 (3d Cir. 1952).
112. Id. at 262.
113. Id. at 261.
114. Id. at 261-62.
115. Id. at 263 (quoting Gen. Couns. Mem. 25,250, 1947-2 C.B. 32). The Commissioner
presumably attempted to distinguish the General Counsel Memorandum on the ground
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Other courts have followed the Feinberg result over the Commis-
sioner's opposition. In Spalding v. Commissioner,116 Charles Spalding
had been separated from his first wife Elizabeth Spalding in 1962. Af-
ter their separation, Elizabeth resided in Connecticut and Charles re-
sided in New York. In 1964 Charles obtained an ex parte divorce in
Nevada after having Elizabeth personally served with the divorce
complaint. She nevertheless challenged the divorce decree in the
courts of New York, which declared it void in 1968. Shortly thereaf-
ter, however, Charles was remarried to Amy Spalding in California.
They lived there together until 1969, when Amy died."
7
Charles, acting as Amy's executor, claimed the marital deduction
on Amy's estate taxes. The Tax Court upheld the Commissioner's dis-
allowance of the marital deduction, citing the New York declaration
that his divorce from Elizabeth was void." 8 The Second Circuit re-
versed, noting that the tax was levied not on Charles but on Amy, who
was a party to neither the Nevada divorce nor the New York declara-
tory judgment, and who had married Charles in good faith.1 9 The
court further noted the lack of any declaration by California courts
that Amy's marriage was void. If any state's determination should
prevail, the court reasoned, it should be that of California, where Amy
was married, where she resided during the marriage, where she died,
and where her estate was probated. 20 In support of this result, the
court noted that it promoted nationwide uniformity of recognition of
a jurisdiction's marriage and divorce decrees, as well as serving a pub-
lic policy of recognizing "the living marriage and not the atrophied
one."121
The Second Circuit had reached the same result earlier in Wond-
sel v. Commissioner,12 a case similar on its facts to Feinberg, involving
a New York taxpayer whose Florida divorce had been declared void
by the New York courts." 3 The Wondsel court reasoned that because
Florida would not be required under the circumstances to honor New
York's judgment under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the Florida
that it applied to cases in which the parties to the divorce did not dispute its validity. The
Feinberg court alluded to this view but did not expressly consider it. 1d; cf. Rev. Rul. 67-
442, 1967-2 C.B. 65 (limiting the General Counsel Memorandum because the Mexican di-
vorce it discussed, although questionable, had never been declared void by an American
court).
116. Spalding v. Commissioner (Estate of Spalding), 537 F.2d 666 (2d Cir. 1976).
117. Id at 667.
118. Id at 666.
119. Id at 669.
120. Id.
121. Id
122. 350 F.2d 339 (2d Cir. 1965).
123. Id at 339-40.
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divorce decree was of sufficient validity to support the taxpayer's de-
duction for alimony payments. 2 4
These decisions have recognized the problem inherent when the
Commissioner must choose among conflicting state determinations.
Failure to respect a determination obtained from the issuing state in
good faith and in conformity with its laws would interfere with the
national uniformity of taxation intended by Congress, because a tax-
payer's marital status for tax purposes could change simply by moving
from a state that recognized the determination to one that did not,
perhaps years after a marriage or divorce had taken place. Failure to
respect such determinations would show insufficient "[f]ederal defer-
ence in matters within the state police power," which the federal gov-
ernment owes to the states because of "the essential character of state
government within our federal system" and not because of a mere
"policy of comity.' 25 Finally, federal recognition of the state domes-
tic relations decisions on which individuals have relied to arrange their
affairs serves federal policy by making tax determinations simple, pre-
dictable, harmonious with the taxpayers' expectations, and respectful
of the taxpayers' relationships, without harm to the fisc or resort to
litigation.
B. Resolution of Conflicts Between Determinations of Foreign
Authorities and State Courts
The courts have faced a more difficult question in determining
whether to recognize the domestic relations decisions rendered by for-
eign jurisdictions, which are entitled to no more than "comity," rather
than the greater deference to which state decisions are entitled be-
cause of considerations of federalism even when they may not be enti-
tled to full faith and credit. True to the aphorism that "hard cases
make bad law,"' 2 6 taxpayers who have obtained divorces in foreign
jurisdictions have encountered highly divergent treatment in the na-
tion's courts. The Supreme Court has not yet spoken to resolve these
differences, nor has the Commissioner settled on a clear, uniform
method for resolving such questions. The decided cases and rulings
nonetheless clarify the interests at stake, which will simplify the devel-
opment of a uniform rule for the tax treatment of same-sex marriages.
Soon after Congress created a deduction for alimony payments in
1942,127 the question arose whether the Commissioner should allow
124. Id. at 341.
125. Ensminger v. Commissioner, 610 F.2d 189, 191 n.4 (4th Cir. 1979) (citing National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 842-43 (1976)).
126. See Hilton v. South Carolina Pub. Ry. Comm'n, 502 U.S. 197, 207 (1991)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
127. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 47
deductions for alimony payments made pursuant to Mexican divorce
decrees.'2 At the time, many American states refused to recognize
the validity of Mexican divorce decrees granted to American citi-
zens. 29 In 1947 the Commissioner ruled that alimony payments made
in good faith pursuant to a Mexican divorce decree would be recog-
nized, even if the validity of the Mexican decree was questionable
under state law.130 In the particular case that prompted the ruling,
both spouses had consented to the Mexican divorce decree.' 3 '
The Commissioner elaborated on this position in 1957 at the re-
quest of a taxpayer who had obtained a Mexican divorce decree and
remarried later the same year. The taxpayer's first wife then filed an
action in their state of residence attacking the validity of the Mexican
decree, which did not award alimony, and demanding a legal separa-
tion with alimony pendente lite. The state court issued an interlocu-
tory decree declaring the Mexican decree void and awarding alimony
pendente lite, which the taxpayer agreed to pay pending a final dispo-
sition. The Commissioner ruled that his 1947 decision to recognize
Mexican divorces was not intended to preclude Internal Revenue Ser-
vice recognition of a later state decree purporting to void the Mexican
decree.32
The Ninth Circuit considered a much different situation in Ger-
sten v. Commissioner.133 Lucille Gersten had obtained an interlocu-
tory decree of divorce from Albert Gersten in the superior court of
California, where they both resided. Under the law at that time, the
parties to the divorce proceeding remained under the jurisdiction of
the court. No final divorce decree could be granted until a year had
passed since the interlocutory decree, and any remarriage by either
party within that time was declared void by statute. Albert nonethe-
less obtained a Mexican divorce only seven months later, married Ber-
nice Gersten on the same day, and filed a joint return with her for the
same taxable year. 34 Apparently Lucille would have paid less tax
that year by filing as Albert's spouse than otherwise, and she insisted
on doing so.' 35 The Ninth Circuit held that the divorce and remar-
riage were void by operation of law, even though no California court
128. See, eg., Estate of Borax v. Commissioner, 349 F.2d 666, 668-71 (2d Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 383 U.S. 935 (1966).
129. See Montemurro v. INS, 409 F.2d 832 (9th Cir. 1969) (noting that California re-
fused to validate Mexican divorces); Dwyer v. Folsom, 139 F. Supp. 571 (E.D.N.Y. 1956)
(holding Mexican divorce decree invalid).
130. Gen. Couns. Mem. 25,250, 1947-2 C.B. 32, 33.
131. Id.
132. Rev. Rul. 57-113, 1957-1 C.B. 106.
133. 267 F.2d 195 (9th Cir. 1959).
134. Id. at 199-200.
135. The court's explanation on this point is not clear. However, the court considered
it important to announce that "[t]he community rights of the former marriage are still in
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had made a judgment to that effect. 136 The Gersten court did not even
mention the contrary positions taken by the Commissioner in the 1947
or 1957 rulings, although it could have distinguished them and reached
the same result on the ground that Albert was under the continuing
personal jurisdiction of the California court.
The Second Circuit reached the opposite result in Estate of Borax
v. Commissioner. 137 After their marriage faltered, Herman and Ruth
Borax executed a written separation agreement, under which Herman
made support payments to Ruth and their child. Six years later, Her-
man obtained an ex parte divorce in Mexico and immediately married
Hermine Borax. Ruth then obtained a declaratory judgment from a
New York court that Herman's Mexican divorce and subsequent re-
marriage were void. Herman nonetheless continued to live with
Hermine and to make support payments to Ruth. Several years later,
the Commissioner discovered the New York judgment and reopened
Herman's tax returns, disallowing his alimony deductions, his joint re-
turn with Hermine, and his claimed exemptions for Hermine's parents
and her children.138 In a long opinion by Judge Thurgood Marshall,
the court held that the Mexican divorce should be recognized for tax
purposes. 39 Recognition would promote certainty and uniformity of
federal treatment of the foreign jurisdiction's divorces, the court
noted; since states were free to accept or reject the Mexican divorce,
reliance on one state court's declaration of invalidity would under-
mine certainty and uniformity. 40 Furthermore, recognition would al-
low federal courts to avoid resolving conflicts in domestic relations
that are beyond their competence.' 41 Recognition would also pro-
mote congressional intent to tax genuine support payments to the re-
cipient; since Congress had amended the Internal Revenue Code to
treat support payments as alimony if made pursuant to a written sepa-
ration agreement regardless of the marital status of the parties under
state law, the Mexican decree should be entitled to recognition as
well.' 42 Finally, the court reasoned that since Congress intended that
the marital status provisions of the code be construed uniformly, Her-
man's divorce should be recognized for purposes of the joint return
and dependency exemptions as well. 143 The court acknowledged that
existence." Id. at 200. Since Albert intended to abandon his community property rights by
filing jointly with Bernice, the they must have benefited Lucille.
136. Id.
137. 349 F.2d 666 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 935 (1966).
138. Id. at 668-69.
139. Id. at 670.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 670-71; see I.R.C. of 1954 § 71(a), 68A Stat. at 19.
143. Borax, 349 F.2d at 675 (citing S. REP. No. 1013, supra note 31, pt. 1, at 50, 1948
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1212).
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the price for its "rule of validation" was to subject Ruth to the tax
consequences of a divorce that she did not want.144
Dissatisfied with the results in both Borax and Wondse145 and
unable to obtain review in the Supreme Court,146 the Commissioner
announced that the Internal Revenue Service would simply ignore
them.147 Instead, issuing a purported "clarification" of his 1947 posi-
tion,148 the Commissioner said that when a state court declares an-
other jurisdiction's divorce decree to be void, "the Internal Revenue
Service will usually follow the later court decision rather than the
prior divorce decree.' 49 In the case that prompted the ruling, the
taxpayer had obtained a Mexican divorce in 1961 and subsequently
remarried. The taxpayer's first wife sought and obtained a declaratory
judgment from an American court that the divorce and remarriage
were void. 150 The Commissioner held that the state court's declara-
tion of voidness would be respected. The Commissioner offered no
guidance about the factors that would determine whether to follow
the state court declaration or the prior divorce beyond distinguishing
his prior opinion on the ground that the Mexican divorce decree in-
volved in that case was questionable under state law but had never
actually been declared void.15'
The Commissioner's position became even more nuanced in Rev-
enue Ruling 71-390.152 The taxpayer who requested the ruling was
separated from his wife under a decree of separate maintenance in
state X, where they lived. He later obtained a divorce in Mexico,
which his wife did not contest, and remarried in state Y. The Mexican
divorce decree did not incorporate the terms of the prior decree of
separate maintenance. The taxpayer's first wife subsequently sought
and obtained an order for increased support from state X. However,
she did not inform state X about the Mexican divorce, because state X
would have refused to order further support if it found that the Mexi-
can divorce decree was valid. The Commissioner ruled that since state
144. The principal adverse consequence was taxation of her alimony payments. Id. at
669-70.
145. See supra notes 122-124 and accompanying text.
146. See Commissioner v. Estate of Borax, 383 U.S. 935 (1966) (denying certiorari);
Commissioner v. Wondsel, 383 U.S. 935 (1966) (denying certiorari).
147. Rev. Rul. 67-442, 1967-2 C.B. 65.
148. Gen. Couns. Mem. 25,250, 1947-2 C.B. 32; see supra note 115 and accompanying
text.
149. Id. (emphasis added).
150. Id.
151. Id- The Commissioner apparently considered it relevant that the taxpayer's first
spouse had "promptly challenged" the divorce in "a state court with personal jurisdiction
of the parties and jurisdiction of the subject matter of the action." Id, However, the ruling
does not expressly hold that these factors were determinative.
152. 1971-2 C.B. 82.
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X had not declared the divorce void, its validity could not be ques-
tioned, so the taxpayer's second marriage would be recognized. The
Commissioner also ruled that the new support order was valid, even
though state X would not have issued the order if it had known about
and recognized the Mexican divorce. 153 Paradoxically echoing the
logic applied by Judge Marshall in Borax, the Commissioner empha-
sized that "the factual status of whether the parties are living apart
rather than their exact marital status in law" should be
determinative. 15
4
Despite their disagreement on doctrinal issues, these cases and
rulings can be harmonized on their facts. First, when the parties in-
volved obviously wanted to be divorced but had obtained legally in-
consistent decrees merely to adjust the amount of alimony payments,
the divorces and the alimony actually paid were recognized. 155 Sec-
ond, when the taxpayer and the spouse disagreed about the divorce
and recognition would financially penalize one but nonrecognition
would penalize the other, the result causing the least financial harm
would be reached, at least in the absence of fraudulent conduct. 56
Third, as with conflicts among state determinations, the adjudicator
would make the decision that promotes nationwide uniformity and
153. Id.
154. Id.; cf. Estate of Borax v. Commissioner, 349 F.2d 666, 670-71 (2d Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 383 U.S. 935 (1966).
155. Three decisions concerning parties whose desire to be divorced was obvious re-
sulted in recognition of the divorce or separate maintenance and of whichever support
order the taxpayer actually paid. Rev. Rut. 71-390, 1971-2 C.B. 82 (recognizing both Mexi-
can divorce decree obtained by husband and legally inconsistent American order of sepa-
rate maintenance obtained by wife when apparent intent and practical effect was merely to
increase support payments); Rev. Rul. 57-113, 1957-1 C.B. 106 (same); Gen. Couns. Mem.
25,250, 1947-2 C.B. 32, 33 (recognizing a Mexican divorce of questionable validity when
both parties consented).
156. In Estate of Borax v. Commissioner, 349 F.2d at 666, the taxpayer would have lost
alimony deductions, the ability to file a joint return with his new wife, and exemptions for
several dependents if his divorce were not recognized; if it were recognized, his first wife
would owe tax on her past alimony payments, but no other penalty. Id. at 668-70.
Although the taxpayer obtained his Mexican divorce ex pane, he did so only after six years
of legal separation pursuant to a formal written agreement that he continued to honor,
including the alimony provision. Id. at 668.
Although the facts are less clear in Gersten v. Commissioner, 267 F.2d 195 (9th Cir.
1959), it appears that the taxpayer obtained the Mexican divorce in order to fraudulently
deprive his first wife of her community property rights. ld. at 200. Given his blameworthy
conduct, the court was not concerned that Albert might lose the right to file a joint return
with either his first wife or his second wife for the taxable year in question. Id.
Finally, although few facts are recited in Rev. Rul. 67-442, 1967-2 C.B. 65, the Com-
missioner appears to have inferred that the Mexican divorce was nonconsensual and possi-
bly fraudulent from the wife's immediate and successful action in state court for a
declaratory judgment that the Mexican divorce was void.
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certainty if it does not sacrifice equity.157 Finally, although there is
little concern about deference to a foreign jurisdiction's exercise of its
police powers, federal policy is nonetheless advanced by recognizing
taxpayers' good-faith attempts to order their affairs.' 58
IV. Proposal: Uniform Federal Recognition of Same-
Sex Marriages
When the Internal Revenue Service receives its first tax return
from a legally married same-sex couple, it will also be confronted with
two novel legal issues: What effect, if any, will the Defense of Mar-
riage Act 159 have? And if DOMA does not resolve every issue, how
should the Internal Revenue Code and past judicial and administra-
tive decisions guide the Commissioner's treatment of the return?
The best solution-considering the longstanding goals of nation-
wide uniformity, certainty, deference to state regulation of marriage,
and respect for taxpayers' good-faith efforts to order their domestic
matters-would be to recognize same-sex marriages that are valid in
the state where performed.
A. Constitutionality of the Defense of Marriage Act
A full exposition of the constitutional infirmities of DOMA is un-
fortunately beyond the scope of this Note, which went to press as
DOMA was enacted into law.160 However, the following issues rele-
vant to the topic of this Note are bound to be raised.
The first substantive provision of DOMA purports to excuse the
states from any obligation to recognize same-sex marriages under the
Full Faith and Credit Clause of the federal Constitution.' 6' Propo-
157. Borax, 349 F.2d at 670; Gen. Couns. Mem. 25,250 (establishing a uniform rule of
recognition of consensual Mexican divorces); see also Rev. Rul. 71-390 (recognizing doctri-
nally conflicting Mexican and American decrees when practical effect was merely to in-
crease support payments); Rev. Rul. 57-113 (same). But see Rev. Rul. 67-442 (declining to
give specific standards to guide choice between foreign decree and later American decree,
although result appears to be driven by equity).
158. Borax, 349 F.2d at 670-71 (opining that divorces should be recognized for tax pur-
poses when they exist practically if not legally); Gen. Couns. Mem. 25,250 (same); see also
Rev. Rul. 71-390 (recognizing inconsistent decrees to further taxpayers' purpose of simply
adjusting support payments); Rev. Rul. 57-113 (same).
159. DOMA, Pub. L. No. 104-199 (1996) (to be codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738C).
160. President Clinton signed DOMA on Saturday, September 21, 1996, just after mid-
night, in order to minimize publicity. Purdum, supra note 16, at A2.
161. DOMA sec. 2 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738C). This full-faith exemption
reads as follows:
CERTAIN ACTS, RECORDS, AND PROCEEDINGS AND THE EFFECT THEREOF. No
State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian trbe, shall be re-
quired to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other
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nents of DOMA claim that this provision merely exercises congres-
sional power under the Full Faith and Credit Clause' 62 to
"prescribe . .. the effect beyond a state's borders of public acts,
records, and judicial proceedings. 163
Such an interpretation glosses over the careful wording of the
Clause and represents an unprecedented assertion of congressional
power under the Clause. The first sentence casts the full-faith duty of
the states in mandatory language with the word "shall." The second
sentence does not authorize Congress to excuse this duty; it merely
allows Congress to prescribe the methods of proving and act entitled
to full faith, and the effect of the proof.164
This reading finds support in the four statutes before DOMA that
Congress enacted under the authority of the Clause. The two older
statutes simply provide methods of proving acts subject to the duty of
full faith and credit.'6 5 The two newer provisions, which relate to in-
terstate recognition of child custody and child support orders, go be-
yond prescribing methods of proof; however, when Congress enacted
them it expressly relied not only on its Full Faith and Credit Clause
power, but also on its Due Process Clause and Commerce Clause
powers.' 66 Unlike these statutes, DOMA rests percariously on the
suppositoin that the Full Faith and Credit Clause alone gives Congress
the power to exempt the states from the otherwise mandatory duty to
recognize each other's acts.
The second substantive provision of DOMA declares that only a
marriage between a man and a woman will be recognizes for purposes
of any federal program. 67 Both this provision and the full-faith ex-
State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship between persons of
the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State,
territory, possession, or tribe, or a right or claim arising from such a relationship.
Id.
162. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. The Clause provides:
Full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts, records,
and judicial proceedings of every other state. And the Congress may by general
laws prescribe the manner in which such acts, records, and proceedings shall be
proved, and the effect thereof.
Id
163. Reske, supra note 14, at 32, 33 (quoting DOMA sponsor Sen. Don Nickles).
164. See supra note 162.
165. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1738, 1739 (1994).
166. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1738A, 1738B (1994); Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders
Act, Pub. L. No. 103-383, sec. 2(a)(4), 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. (108 Stat.) 4063, 4063-64 (1994);
Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-611, sec. 7(a)(4), 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. (94 Stat.) 3566, 3568-69 (1980).
167. DOMA see. 3 (to be codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7). In full, the nonrecognition provi-
sion reads as follows:
DEFINrrION OF "MARRIAGE" AND "SPOUSE." In determining the meaning of
any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the various
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emption are vulnerable to the Supreme Court's decision in Romer v.
Evans,168 which held that the Equal Protection Clause forbade a Colo-
rado constitutional amendment that nullified all state legislative, exec-
utive, and judicial action designed to protect the rights of lesbians and
gay men. The Court held that even under the deferential "rational
basis" test, a law imposing a "special disability" on gay men and lesbi-
ans as a class violated the Equal Protection Clause.169
It is unclear how far the Court will extend the principles of Evans,
however. Many observers see an unreconciled contradiction between
Evans and Bowers v. Hardwick,170 although the latter case upholding
Georgia's criminal sodomy statute was decided only as a substantive
due process case and not as an equal protection case.17'
On one hand, under the Evans standard, the Court might view
the vitriolic Congressional debate over DOMA as strong evidence of
legislative animosity against lesbians and gay men. Legislative bigotry
was the Court's chief concern in Evans, even though it could be
demonstrated only inferentially with respect to voters supporting the
Colorado referendum. 172 On the other hand, the Court might be
swayed by arguments that Western moral teaching has invariably and
unalterably defined the marital relationship as heterosexual, and that
a law reinforcing that moral tradition must beet the rational basis
test. 73 Such arguments have persisted withstanding persuasive schol-
arly research demonstrating that most societies have accepted and
even celebrated same-sex relationships, including Western society
before the Middle Ages. 174
Because DOMA violates the Equal Protection Clause and ex-
ceeds the limited power conferred on Congress by the Full Faith and
Credit Clause, it should be held unconstitutional.
administrative bureaus and agencies of the United States, the word "marriage"
means only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife,
and the word "spouse" refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a hus-
band or a wife.
Ld.
168. 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
169. Id at 1627-29.
170. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
171. Id. at 196 n.8; Richard C. Reuben, Gay Rights Watershed?, A.B.A. J., July 1996, at
30; see also Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1629 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
172. Evans, 116 S. Ct. at 1628-29.
173. See Carolyn Lochhead, Senate OKs Gay Marriage Restrictions, S.F. CHRON., Sept.
11, 1996, at Al, All (quoting DOMA cosponsor Sen. Robert Byrd's argument that
"[t]housands of years of Judeo-Christian teaching leave absolutely no doubt as to the sanc-
tity of the union of one man and one woman"); cf. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 197 (Burger, C.J.,
concurring) ("[to] hold that the act of homosexual sodomy is somehow protected as a fun-
damental right would be to cast aside millenia of moral teaching").
174. See generally BoswELL, CmusTrANrry, supra note 1; BoswELL, SAlm-SEX UN-
IONS, supra note 1; ESKRMGE, supra note 1; Eskridge, supra note 1.
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B. Coressional Deference to State Regulation of Marriage
Assuming that DOMA will be held unconstitutional, the path to
recognition of same-sex marriages by the Internal Revenue Service is
relatively clear. Despite the nearly continuous legislative struggles
over the regulation of the incidents of marriage (particularly commu-
nity property rights) through the 1940s, the legislative history of the
Internal Revenue Code reflects no debate on what kinds of marriages
Congress intended to recognize, and certainly none on same-sex
marriages. 175
However, the scant legislative history should not be mistaken for
silence. Whenever an important issue of marriage or the incidents of
marriage has been raised, Congress almost invariably chose to give the
greatest possible deference to state regulation of marriage. First, de-
spite the unfair advantage of income-splitting available only to resi-
dents of community property states, Congress refused for more than
twenty years to adopt any solution that would derogate the commu-
nity property system.176 A lasting solution was finally achieved by the
adoption of optional income-splitting for all married taxpayers, which
respects both the community property and common-law systems. 177
Second, when faced with a perceived abuse of the dependent exemp-
tion, Congress chose to give the broadest possible deference to state
regulation of domestic relations by prohibiting the dependent exemp-
tion for household members whose relationship to the taxpayer "is in
violation of local law," rather than defining detailed federal excep-
tions to the dependent exemption.178
Moreover, Congress could have required taxpayers to meet some
other test in addition to being validly married, as it has done with
other programs, but did not.179 The Internal Revenue Code contains
175. See supra Part iI.
176. See supra notes 52-60 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 60-70 and accompanying text.
178. See supra subpart II.D (discussing the Turnipseed case). Congress had other op-
tions, of course. For example, it could have specified the sexual relationships that would
disqualify a household member from being claimed as a dependent, giving the states no
latitude for adjusting the definition to contemporary standards in an area traditionally sub-
ject to their police powers.
179. Two reported decisions purport to address the issue of recognition of same-sex
relationships for purposes of federal benefits. Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1111; McConnell v. Nooner, 547 F.2d 54 (8th Cir. 1976) (per
curiam).
In Adams, Anthony Sullivan was an Australian national who began a relationship with
Frank Adams, an American citizen, in 1971. See Sullivan v. INS, 772 F.2d 609, 611 (9th Cir.
1985) (Pregerson, J., dissenting). In 1975 Sullivan's visa expired and he was in danger of
deportation. However, Sullivan and Adams obtained a marriage license from the county
clerk in Boulder, Colorado, and had a wedding ceremony performed by a minister. Adams
thereupon petitioned the Immigration and Naturalization Service to classify Sullivan as his
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no provisions whatsoever that classify taxpayers on the basis of their
sexual orientation or the sex of their spouses.180 Congress also de-
clined to provide for an independent federal determination whether a
particular marriage qualifies for recognition under the general provi-
sions of the tax laws. 81
spouse, which would have qualified him for preferential admission to the United States.
Adams, 673 F.2d at 1038.
The Adams court held that there are two elements under the Immigration and Nation-
ality Act for recognition of spouses: "whether the marriage is valid under state law" and
"whether that state-approved marriage qualifies under the Act." Id The court assumed
for purposes of its decision that the Adams-Sullivan marriage was valid under Colorado
law (a proposition that the court found dubious at best). Id. at 1039. The court then held
that Congress intended to deny recognition to same-sex marriages, basing its decision on
three factors: that Congress did not "indicate[ ] an intent to enlarge the ordinary meaning
of" the term "marriage" beyond its "ordinary meaning" of "a relationship between a man
and a woman"; that other provisions of the Act prohibited homosexuals from immigrating
to the United States; and that Congress has plenary authority to regulate immigration by
"rules that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens." Id. at 103942 (citing Pub. L. No.
89-236, § 15(b), 79 Stat. 911, 919 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4)); S. REp. No. 748, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess. 18-19, reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3328, 3343).
In McConnell, Richard Baker was a veteran who received educational benefits from
the Veterans Administration under the GI Bill. He and his partner, James McConnell,
obtained a marriage license from a county clerk in Minnesota; a minister then performed a
marriage ceremony for them. Baker then petitioned the Veteran's Administration to in-
crease his educational benefits on the ground that McConnell was his dependent spouse.
547 F.2d at 55.
The McConnell court looked to the statutory provision that marital status for purposes
of veterans benefits should be determined "according to the law of the place where the
parties resided at the time of the marriage or the law of the place where the parties resided
when the right to benefits accrued." Id. at 55 (quoting Act of Sept. 2, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-
857, 72 Stat. 1109 (codified at 38 U.S.C. § 103(c))). Baker and McConnell had already
been denied the right to marry by the Minnesota Supreme Court. Baker v. Nelson, 191
N.W.2d 185, 185-87 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed for want of substantialfederal question,
409 U.S. 810 (1972). The McConnell court thus held that they were collaterally estopped
from relitigating the issue against the Veterans Administration.
The precedential value of both these decisions is questionable, however, because
neither case involved a marriage that was recognized by any state. No federal court has yet
faced a litigant who was legally married to a person of the same sex.
180. Section 152(b)(5) of the Internal Revenue Code, which denies dependency ex-
emptions if "the relationship between [the claimed dependent] and the taxpayer is in viola-
tion of local law," is no exception. The provision was enacted in response to a single man's
claimed dependent exemption for a married woman with whom he had a sexual relation-
ship; the reported cases deal exclusively with heterosexual couples. See supra subpart II.D;
cf Adams, 673 F.2d at 1040 (noting that express provisions of the Immigration and Nation-
ality Act prohibited immigration of homosexuals to the United States).
181. See I.R.C. §§ 6013(d), 7701(a)(17), 7703 (1994); cf. Adams, 673 F.2d at 1040 (not-
ing that express provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act as then in effect prohib-
ited immigration of homosexuals to the United States); McConnel; 547 F.2d at 55 (quoting
statutory provision on recognition of marriages). There are special provisions for purposes
of the dependent care credit and the "catch-all" dependency exemption; however, these
provisions do not, on their face, distinguish on the basis of sexual orientation. See I.R.C.
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It might also be argued that there exists a public policy against
recognizing same-sex marriages. Tax benefits (including those per-
taining to marriage) generally are a matter of legislative grace; within
basic constitutional restraints, Congress may choose to grant or deny
them as it pleases. 182 However, the Supreme Court has declared that
the public policy exception is narrow and applies only when declared
explicitly by Congress or by a state.183 Assuming that DOMA is de-
clared unconstitutional, 84 there would remain no explicit federal pol-
icy on sexual orientation, on same-sex marriages, or on the relevance
of either with respect to taxation. This absence would remove any
basis for a claim that a federal public policy bars recognition of same-
sex marriages.
State public policies are more problematic. In direct response to
the prospect of same-sex marriages in Hawaii, at least ten states as of
this writing have enacted laws that proclaim a public policy against
same-sex marriages and refuse to recognize them when performed
outside the state.' 85 Four more states already had such laws.' 86 Simi-
lar legislation was proposed this year in at least sixteen other states. 8 7
§ 21(e) (1994) (relating to the dependent care credit); id. § 152(a)(9) (1994) (relating to the
dependency exemption).
182. See United States v. Winters, 261 F.2d 675, 676 (10th Cir. 1958); Hoover Motor
Express Co. v. United States, 241 F.2d 459, 460 (6th Cir. 1957), affd, 356 U.S. 38. 40, reh'g
denied, 356 U.S. 934 (1958).
183. Lilly v. Commissioner, 343 U.S. 90, 96-97 (1952).
184. See supra subpart IV.A.
185. Act of May 1, 1996, 1996 Ariz. Sess. Laws 348 (to be codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 25-101, 25-112); Act of May 7, 1996, 1996 Alaska Sess. Laws 21, sec. 2 (to be
codified at ALASKA STAT. §§ 25.05.011-.013); Act of Apr. 2, 1996, 1996 Ga. Laws 1025 (to
be codified at GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-3.1); IDAHO CODE § 32-209 (1996); Act of May 24,
1996, Pub. Act No. 89-459 (to be codified at 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/212); Act of Apr. 10,
1996, S.B. 515, 76th Leg., 1996 Reg. Sess. (to be codified at KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-101, 23-
115); Act of June 25, 1996, 1996 Mich. Pub. Acts 324 (to be codified at MICH. COMP. LAWS
§§ 551.1-.4); Act of June 25, 1996, 1996 Mich. Pub. Acts 334 (to be codified at MICH. COMP.
LAWS §§ 551.271-.272); Act of June 20, 1996, 1996 N.C. Sess. Laws 588 (to be codified at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51-1.2); Act of May 20, 1996, 1996 S.C. Acts 327 (to be codified at S.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 20-1-10, 20-1-15); Act of May 15, 1996, S.B. 2305, 99th Gen. Assem., 2d
Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 1996).
186. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. arts. 89, 96 (West 1993); TEx. FAM. CODE § 1.01 (West
1993); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-2 (Michie 1995); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-45.2 (Michie 1992).
Article 89 of the Louisiana Civil Code dates to 1870, by far the oldest such statute. The
remaining provisions date to the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s.
187. S.B. 396, 1996 Reg. Sess. (Ala.) (indefinitely postponed May 8, 1996); H.B. 1942,
1996 Reg. Sess. (Ala.); A.B. 1982, 1995-1996 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1996) (killed); A.B. 3227,
1995-1996 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1996) (killed); H.B. 1291, 60th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess.
(Colo. 1996) (vetoed by governor); H.B. 2369, 1996 Reg. Sess. (Fla.) (withdrawn Mar. 12,
1996); H.B. 500, 1996 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 1996); H.B. 1268, 1996 Leg. Sess. (Md.) (reported
unfavorably by the Comm. on the Judiciary Mar. 18, 1996); S.B. 2863, 1996 Leg. Sess.
(Miss.) (died in committee); H.B. 1210, 1996 Leg. Sess. (Miss.) (died in committee); S.B.
895, 88th Gen. Assem., 2d Sess. (Mo. 1996); H.B. 1255, 88th Gen. Assem., 2d Sess. (Mo.
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However, even the existence of an express public policy in some
states against recognition of same-sex marriages should not cause the
Internal Revenue Service to deny recognition. Since at least one state
will have a public policy favoring same-sex marriage and a number of
states will likely be neutral, it would violate the principle of nation-
wide uniformity to make federal tax recognition depend upon the ac-
cident of the taxpayer's state of residence. 188
Because the legislative history of the Internal Revenue Code
evinces an intent to defer almost completely to state domestic rela-
tions law, because Congress declined to add any additional qualifica-
tion beyond a legally recognized marriage, and because there is no
nationwide public policy against same-sex marriage, 189 the Internal
Revenue Service should conclude that congressional intent is consis-
tent with federal tax recognition of same-sex marriage.
1996); H.B. 1454, 88th Gen. Assem., 2d Sess. (Mo. 1996) (withdrawn Apr. 9, 1996); H.B.
1458, 88th Gen. Assem., 2d Sess. (Mo. 1996); L.B. 1260, 94th Leg., 2d Sess. (Neb. 1996);
S.B. 1376,207th Leg., 1st Ann. Sess. (N.J. 1996); A.B. 2193,207th Leg., 1st Ann. Sess. (NJ.
1996); SJ. Res. 10, 42d Leg., 2d Sess. (N.M. 1996) (proposing state constitutional amend-
ment); S.B. 7345, 219th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1996); A.B. 9861, 219th Gen.
Assem., 2d Reg. Ses. (N.Y. 1996); S.B. 434, 180th Gen. Assem., 1995-1996 Reg. Sess. (Pa.
1996); S.B. 1558, 180th Gen. Assem., 1995-1996 Reg. Sess. (Pa. 1996); H.B. 2604, 180th
Gen. Assem., 1995-1996 Reg. Sess. (Pa. 1996); H.B. 2262, 54th Leg., 1996 Reg. Sess.
(Wash.); H.B. 4730, 1996 Reg. Sess. (W. Va.); A.B. 1042, 92d Leg., 1995-1996 Reg. Sess.
(Wis. 1996); H.B. 412, 53d Leg., Budget Sess. (Wyo. 1996) (failed introduction); see also
Colorado Governor Vetoes Gay Marriage Ban, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 26, 1996, at A3.
TWo more states that have comprehensive antidiscrimination statutes covering sexual
orientation expressly exclude the marriage laws from their reach. CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 46a-81r (1995); MINN. STAT. § 363.021 (West Supp. 1996). However, neither state ex-
pressly bars recognition of same-sex marriages.
In Hawaii itself, the state House passed a bill to put on the November ballot a consti-
tutional amendment that would ban same-sex marriages and overrule Baehr v. Lewin.
H.B. 2173, 18th Leg. (Haw. 1996); see also Gay Marriage Stymies Hawaii House, Senate,
S.F. CHRON., Mar. 7, 1996, at C4. A similar bill was killed in the state Senate Judiciary
Committee, along with a bill that would have expressly authorized same-sex marriages.
Leonard, supra note 8. Instead, the Senate passed a bill creating a domestic partnership'
with all the rights of marriage, with the goal of creating a status that would satisfy the
Hawaii Supreme Court's equal protection concerns but that would not be entitled to recog-
nition outside Hawaii. S.B. 2419, 18th Leg., § 1 (Haw. 1996); see also Gay Marriage Sty-
mies Hawaii House, Senate, supra, at C4. The differences between the House and Senate
bills were not resolved before the 1996 legislative session ended, so no new law was en-
acted before the trial in Baehr v. Miike. See Gay Marriage Stymies Hawaii House, Senate,
supra, at C4.
188. Congress intended the provisions on marital status to be applied uniformly. See S.
REP. No. 1013, supra note 31, at 50, 1948 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1212; see also Spalding v. Com-
missioner (Estate of Spalding), 537 F.2d 666, 669 (2d Cir. 1976); Estate of Borax v. Com-
missioner, 349 F.2d 666, 670 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 935 (1966); Campbell v.
Commissioner, 15 T.C. 355, 360 (1950) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess.
72 (1942)); supra subparts II.C, Im.A.
189. Again, this assumes that DOMA is declared unconstitutional. See supra subpart
IV.A.
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C. Avoiding Conflicts Between State Property Rights and Federal
Taxation Obligations
A finding of congressional intent to defer to state recognition of
same-sex marriage is also supported by consideration of the conse-
quences of nonrecognition. The prospect of a marriage that may be
recognized under applicable state law but not under federal law may
revive important taxation problems that Congress has already solved
for opposite-sex couples. Even if the Defense of Marriage Act is held
constitutional, it cannot solve these important problems.
(1) The Income-Splitting Problem
If any states willingly recognize Hawaii same-sex marriages, the
community property states of California and Washington are among
the most likely to do so. These states are relatively close to Hawaii,
and both have large gay and lesbian communities whose members are
likely to travel to Hawaii in large numbers to be married if the bar to
same-sex marriages is lifted. Moreover, the political climate sur-
rounding recognition of same-sex marriages is likely more conducive
in those two states than in most other states.
Recognition by Washington or California would bring same-sex
spouses into the community property system.190 Even if the Internal
Revenue Service denied "married" filing status to same-sex spouses
under DOMA, the community property laws would entitle them to
split their incomes on separate returns.191 This would create signifi-
cant administrative problems, because the Service would be forced to
match up the pairs of separate returns to determine whether same-sex
couples were filing properly. Many of these "quasi-married" couples
would probably be confused about the extent to which the Service
considered them married, and whether they could file as married.
This revival of income-splitting would erode uniformity even
among states that willingly recognize same-sex marriages, because res-
idents of common-law states, including Hawaii, would not be entitled
to income splitting if the Service were not required to recognize their
same-sex marriages.
(2) The Problem of Marital Property Settlements-Davis and Farid-Es-
Sultaneh
Failure by the Internal Revenue Service to recognize a same-sex
marriage that is valid under state law would also revive the Davis/
Farid problem of marital property transfers. In Farid-Es-Sultaneh v.
190. Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101, 112 (1930).
191. Id. at 118.
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Commissioner,192 Doris Farid-Es-Sultaneh made an antenuptial agree-
ment with S.S. Kresge under which she released all marital property
rights in exchange for appreciated stock in the S.S. Kresge Company.
Kresge's basis in the stock was about $0.15 per share, but the fair mar-
ket value of the stock was about $10.67 per share.193 The Second Cir-
cuit held that Ms. Farid-Es-Sultaneh's basis in the stock was its fair
market value; since her marital property rights were valuable, she did
not receive the stock as a gift, in which case she would have taken it
subject to Mr. Kresge's transferred basis. Accordingly, when Ms. Fa-
rid-Es-Sultaneh sold the stock she had to pay capital gains taxes only
on the amount by which the stock exceeded $10.67 per share, and not
on the much higher amount by which it exceeded $0.15 per share.
United States v. Davis94 involved a property settlement incident
to divorce. The taxpayer-husband transferred appreciated securities
to his wife in exchange for her release of her marital property
rights.195 Following Farid, the Court held that the transfer was not a
gift, and that the taxpayer-husband realized a gain on the exchange,
on which he was obligated to pay capital gains taxes.196
The problem posed by the Davis/Farid rule was that it drew an
artificial distinction between transfers that took place during the mar-
riage (which were regarded as gifts, thus not taxable events to the
transferor, and imparting a transferred basis to the recipient under
section 1015) and transfers incident to a change in marital status
(which were regarded as transfers for value, thus taxable events to the
transferor, and imparting a transferred basis of fair market value
under section 1012). While it was in effect, the rule created a consid-
erable enforcement burden for the Internal Revenue Service: trans-
feror-spouses rarely seemed to be aware of Davis and thus failed to
report their taxable gains on the transfer of appreciated property,
while transferee-spouses always seemed to be aware of Farid and thus
computed their gains or losses by using the fair market value at the
time of receipt. This created a whipsaw, with no gain being reported
by either spouse. 97 Moreover, the Davis/Farid rule caused different
treatment of residents of common-law and community property juris-
dictions, because the latter could avoid its application simply by char-
acterizing property transfers incident to divorce as divisions of the
property of the marital community. 98
192. 160 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1947).
193. Id. at 813.
194. 370 U.S. 65 (1962).
195. i& at 66-67.
196. Id at 67-68, 71-73.
197. See MAvin A. CHiREESTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: A LAW STUDENT'S
GUIDE TO THE LEADING CASES AND CONCEPTS 87-88 (6th ed. 1991).
198. Id. at 87.
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Congress finally solved this problem in 1984 by enacting section
1041, which overruled both Davis and Farid by providing that all
property transfers between spouses either during marriage or incident
to divorce would be treated as gifts.199 But if the Commissioner re-
fuses (under DOMA or otherwise) to recognize same-sex spouses as
"married" for purposes of the Internal Revenue Code, the Davis/Fa-
rid problem will be revived. State-recognized marriage for same-sex
couples will bring with it the same valuable marital property rights
enjoyed by all married couples. Unless the Internal Revenue Service
recognizes same-sex spouses as married for tax purposes, it will once
again be saddled with close policing of significant property settlements
to avoid a whipsaw.
D. Nationwide Recognition Promotes Federal Policy
Nationwide tax recognition of same-sex marriages would pro-
mote several traditional federal policy goals. First, it would promote
nationwide uniformity and certainty of tax treatment, without differ-
ences depending on the state where taxpayers were married, the state
where they are domiciled, their decisions to move to another state, or
their domicile's system of marital property regulation.200
Second, nationwide recognition coupled with the repeal or judi-
cial invalidation of DOMA201 would restore the traditional federal
deference to state regulation of marriage. Not until 1996 did Congress
dare to invade this province of state police power, a fact noted by
many legislators debating DOMA.2 02 DOMA attempts to deprive the
states of their power to create a nationally recognized marriage.
DOMA proponents contend, of course, that DOMA increases the
state power to regulate marriage by allowing the states to choose
which marriages they wish to recognize.20 3 But any such aggrandize-
199. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, sec. 421(a), 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
(98 Stat.) 494, 793-95 (codified as I.R.C. § 1041 (1994)).
200. Congress intended the provisions on marital status to be applied uniformly. See S.
REP. No. 1013, supra note 31, at 50, 1948 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1212; see also Spalding v. Com-
missioner (Estate of Spalding), 537 F.2d 666, 669 (2d Cir. 1976); Estate of Borax v. Com-
missioner, 349 F.2d 666, 670 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 935 (1966); Campbell v.
Commissioner, 15 T.C. 355, 360 (1950) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess.
72 (1942)); supra subparts II.C, III.A.
201. See supra subpart IV.A.
202. See Lochhead, supra note 173, at A3; Carolyn Lochhead, House Votes Against
Gay Marriages, S.F. CHRON., July 13, 1996, at Al, All; Carolyn Lochhead, Senate OKs
Gay Marriage Restrictions, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 11, 1996, at Al, All; Panel OKs Same-Sex
Marriage Bill, S.F. CHRON., June 13, 1996, at A2.
203. See sources cited supra note 200.
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ment can come only at the expense of the principles of federalism that
bind our nation together.20 4
Finally, recognition of same-sex marriages for federal taxation
purposes would further the policy of recognizing taxpayers' good-faith
attempts to order their domestic matters. Regardless of what position
the government takes, gay and lesbian couples will continue to build
their lives together, and when so doing most will combine their finan-
cial resources at least to some degree. Tax recognition of this financial
interdependence will simplify matters both for taxpayers and for the
Internal Revenue Service, particularly with regard to taxation of
wealth transfers, characterization of joint assets, and deductions of
joint expenses.
Conclusion
Human relationships, including same-sex relationships, are as old
as humanity and will endure longer than any system of government or
taxation. As the modem federal income tax evolved during the twen-
tieth century, Congress has repeatedly adjusted the tax laws to con-
form to the needs of married taxpayers, and has abandoned its efforts
to make those taxpayers conform to congressional wishes.
So it shall ultimately be for taxpayers in same-sex marriages.
With the enactment of the Defense of Marriage Act205 and with corre-
sponding legislation in many of the states,206 the stage has been set for
a battle by gay and lesbian taxpayers that may last ten years or
longer.207 However, legislative and judicial attitudes toward gay men
and lesbians have changed dramatically over the last three decades,
and they shall continue to do so. Slowly but surely, Congress and the
state legislatures will realize that the needs of the fisc and of the tax-
payer will best be served by recognizing the marriages of gay and les-
bian citizens.
204. See Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226,254-55 (1945) (Rutledge, J., dissent-
ing); id. at 264-65, 271-72 (Black, J., dissenting).
205. Pub. L. No. 104-199 (1996).
206. See supra notes 185-87 and accompanying text.
207. Reske, supra note 14, at 34.
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